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GLOSSARY 
Terms Definitions 
Criticality The measure of the change in neutrons from one generation to 
the next. 
Delayed neutron A neutron that is released sometime after the fission event 
occurs. 
Firewall An intrinsic trait of a material that represents a barrier to 
proliferation. 
Fission An event in which a nucleus separates into multiple parts, 
releasing energy in the process. 
Half-life The amount of time in which half of the radionuclides in a 
sample have decayed. 
HEU Enriched uranium having a concentration of 235U greater than 
20%. 
Induced fission Fission event that is caused by an incident neutron. 
keff The ratio of the number of neutrons in one generation to the 
number of neutrons in the next. 
LEU Enriched uranium having a higher concentration of 235U than 
natural, but less than 20% 235U. 
Material attractiveness The attractiveness a particular material has for weapon’s 
purposes. 
Nuclear nonproliferation The decrease in or spread of nuclear weapons technology or 
materials. 
Nuclear proliferation The increase in or spread of nuclear weapons technology or 
materials. 
Predetonation The detonation of a nuclear weapon before it has reached its 
optimal compression due to the amount of spontaneous fission 
neutrons produced by the material. 
Proliferation resistance The resistance an object (ex.: material, reactor design, fuel 
cycle, etc.) has to be utilized in a nuclear weapons program. 
Prompt neutron A neutron that is released at the moment of the fission event. 
Self-explosion The detonation of high explosives as a result of temperature 
increase above its “self-explosion temperature.” 
Spontaneous fission Fission even that occurs suddenly due to the instability of the 
nucleus. 
Tensile Strength The amount of tensile stress a material can undergo before 
plastic deformation occurs. 
xv 
 
Weaponization The process by which a material is converted to a usable form 
for a nuclear weapon. 
Yield The expected amount of energy released from the detonation 
of a nuclear weapon. 
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Abstract 
Decreasing the material attractiveness of uranium and plutonium materials is crucial to 
nuclear nonproliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements 
safeguards across the world on a limited budget. Not only does decreasing material 
attractiveness reduce the possibility of proliferation, but also may lighten the financial 
burden on the IAEA if safeguards can be reduced. Two particular isotopes that have negative 
material attractiveness traits are 238Pu and 232U. Without isotopic separation technology, 
these isotopes cannot be removed from plutonium and uranium materials respectively. Both 
238Pu and 232U produce large quantities of heat by alpha decay. High decay heat is considered 
one of the primary impacts on material attractiveness. This decay heat causes major issues 
during weaponization and can render the high explosives in a weapon useless and cause 
failure in the materials if high enough temperatures are reached. In addition to high alpha 
decay heat, 238Pu has a high spontaneous fission neutron generation rate, which can lead to 
a reduction in the yield of a nuclear weapon. 232U’s daughter products give a relatively high 
dose rate over time. Both the dose rate and heat generation increase over time, reaching a 
maximum after 10 years. 232U will also create difficulty during the enrichment process. 
Considering 232U is lighter than 235U, its concentration will increase at a higher rate during 
enrichment. The decay of 232U in gaseous UF6 can destroy UF6 molecules creating a variety 
of lighter molecules that must be separated from the enrichment stream. This study will 
evaluate the effects of 238Pu and 232U on material attractiveness. The material attractiveness 
of these materials will be quantified using multiple methods in an attempt to make a broad 
statement about their attractiveness. In order to better understand the feasibility of the 
introduction of 232U into a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, the effects on safety, security, and 
safeguards will also be explored. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
 Limiting the proliferation of nuclear material is crucial for the international use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The utilization of nuclear energy is spreading 
internationally with several countries constructing or considering constructing their first 
commercial nuclear reactor, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the 
United Arab Emirates (1). With the continuous expansion of nuclear energy internationally, 
the possible use of nuclear materials for weapons purposes remains a major concern. 
Although infrequent, this proliferation of nuclear materials has occurred historically such 
as in the case of Iran’s enrichment program (2) or the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) nuclear weapons program (3). 
Increasing the difficulty of proliferation is a complex issue. Proliferation resistance 
is a commonly used term to describe the difficulty in proliferating nuclear technology or 
material. The term is broad and can be applied to anything from a specific nuclear material 
to an entire fuel cycle. Although useful in a qualitative sense, the term lacks the ability to be 
applied quantitatively. In order to limit ambiguity and foster a more quantitative analysis, a 
material’s specific firewalls against proliferation are considered. These firewalls are 
intrinsic features of a material, such as decay heat, that make the material less attractive for 
weapons purposes. This falls within the scope of proliferation resistance and is narrow 
enough to analyze a particular nuclear material. 
 This increase in use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes requires an increase in 
the international safeguards that ensure the material is not used for weapons purposes. 
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Implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), international safeguards 
must cover nuclear fuel cycles across the world with limited resources. The use of these 
limited resources must be as efficient as possible, as to effectively safeguard nuclear 
material and deter proliferation. Decreasing a material’s attractiveness may lead to a 
reduction in safeguards, allowing for resources to be reallocated to more essential tasks. 
Not only is this financially beneficial for the IAEA, but also decreasing material 
attractiveness creates significant obstacles with which a proliferant state must deal with in 
order to weaponize the material. These obstacles can limit a state’s ability to proliferate 
both financially and technologically. Even in a breakout scenario in which a state has 
broken its safeguards agreement and decided to proliferate, decreased material 
attractiveness will slow the state’s proliferation. 
1.2. Objectives 
 The primary objective of this study is to understand the impact of elevated 238Pu 
concentration in plutonium materials and 232U concentration in uranium materials on 
material attractiveness. The impacts on critical mass, decay heat, spontaneous fission 
neutron generation rate, and dose rate from the addition of each isotope will be quantified 
and discussed within the scope of weapons usability. Considering 232U does not occur 
naturally, additional impacts beyond those directly contributing to material attractiveness 
must be considered. In order for 232U to be a realistic option for decreasing material 
attractiveness of uranium materials, the following issues must be explored. The effects on 
the gaseous centrifuge enrichment process from the addition of 232U is evaluated. Also, 
possible issues with safeguards measurements of uranium materials containing 232U is 
considered. From a safety perspective, the dose rate from these proposed uranium 
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materials is calculated and compared to safety standards. The detectability of these 
uranium materials is also simulated. Since 238Pu is found in plutonium from used nuclear 
fuel, these additional issues need not be considered. 
1.3. Background 
1.3.1. Introduction to Nuclear Nonproliferation 
1.3.1.1. Basics of Nuclear Proliferation 
 In order to understand nuclear nonproliferation, one must also understand nuclear 
proliferation. Nuclear proliferation is the increase in or spread of nuclear weapons 
technology or materials. The possession of nuclear weapons represents a certain amount of 
power and prestige for a state entity. Nuclear weapons are one of the most powerful 
weapons ever conceived and are capable of producing destruction on large scales. In 1945, 
the United States detonated the only two nuclear weapons ever used in warfare on the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The weapons had a yield equivalent to 21 and 
15 kilotons of TNT (4).  Although the exact estimates for those killed and wounded vary 
from source to source, an estimated 66,000 died in Hiroshima and 39,000 in Nagasaki. An 
estimated 69,000 were injured in Hiroshima and 25,000 in Nagasaki. These numbers are 
staggering considering the death toll for each was approximately one fourth of the cities’ 
total populations, 255,000 and 195,000 (5). 
The science behind nuclear energy is as follows. Although both the peaceful and 
weapons use of nuclear energy utilize the fission of fissile isotopes, the manner in which 
fission is utilized is slightly different. A fission event can be induced or spontaneous. An 
induced fission event occurs when the nucleus absorbs a neutron and splits. A spontaneous 
fission event occurs spontaneously without the need for neutron absorption. Induced 
4 
 
fission is far more probable in 235U. However, 239Pu has a notable probability of fissioning 
both spontaneously and induced. When a fission event occurs, fission fragments, neutrons, 
and gamma rays are released. Some of the neutrons released are released promptly at the 
moment of fission. These neutrons are called prompt neutrons. However, some neutrons 
are released slightly after. These neutrons are called delayed neutrons. The neutrons from 
one fission event may induce another fission which will release neutrons. The repetition of 
this process makes up a fission chain reaction. In a nuclear reactor, chain reactions are 
intended to be sustained by delayed neutrons. This allows for control by way of insertion 
or removal of control rods. A chain reaction made up of prompt neutrons within a reactor 
would be uncontrollable by human intervention. In a nuclear weapon, the chain reaction is 
intended to comprise solely of prompt neutrons. This allows for a rapid increase in power 
as the weapon is detonated. keff is important in understanding how the chain reactions will 
progress. keff is the ratio of the number of neutrons in a generation to the number of 
neutrons in the previous generation. If keff is less than one, the fissile material is subcritical 
and the chain reaction will eventually end as the number of neutrons are decreasing from 
one generation to the next. If keff is equal to one, the fissile material is critical and the chain 
reaction will continue with each generation having the same number of neutrons. If keff is 
greater than one, the chain reaction will continue with each generation of neutrons 
increasing in number (6). Fission type nuclear weapons are designed such that they’re 
initially subcritical and will become super critical as the fissile material is compressed. 
1.3.1.2. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 
 Nuclear nonproliferation is the decrease in or spread of nuclear weapons 
technology or materials. This field encompasses efforts around the world that seek to 
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prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) was formed as a global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 
The treaty was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This treaty 
creates two classifications of states: Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-nuclear 
Weapons States (NNWS). The five NWS; the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
France, Russia, and China, were classified as such due to the fact that each state possessed 
nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s creation. The remaining signatories of the NPT 
and presumably all future signatories are classified as NNWS. These NNWS agree to not 
pursue nuclear weapons, including both receiving nuclear weapons from other states and 
manufacturing them, in exchange for the ability to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. In order to ensure each NNWS adheres to this agreement, the NPT requires 
NNWS to agree to a nuclear safeguards agreement that is negotiated and monitored by the 
IAEA (7). 
 Each safeguards agreement will be negotiated directly between the IAEA and the 
member state in accordance with the Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153). This 
document discusses the objectives of the safeguards agreement and lays the framework for 
the agreement (8). Including the 5 NWS, 191 states have signed the NPT (9). Thus, the IAEA 
is responsible for imposing safeguards on over 100 states across the world. This immense 
responsibility, coupled with the limited budget of the IAEA, makes implementing 
safeguards in the most efficient manner possible crucial. According to the IAEA Department 
of Safeguards Long-Term Strategic Plan for 2012-2023, the IAEA desires to implement 
“smarter” safeguards to reduce the overall burden of safeguards to where they’re the most 
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needed (10). This is the major motivation for developing nuclear materials resistant to 
proliferation. 
1.3.1.3. Direct Use Nuclear Materials 
Proliferation resistance is especially of concern when considering direct use nuclear 
material. These materials contain fissile isotopes and have significant attractiveness for 
weapons purposes (11). The two most common of these materials are plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium (HEU). 233U is also classified as a direct use nuclear material but is 
far less common in most nuclear fuel cycles across the world. However, with the significant 
research in thorium fuel cycles, 233U may become more pertinent in the proliferation 
resistant conversation. 
Plutonium is created through the burnup of uranium and is thus present in all used 
nuclear fuel. Although 239Pu is the most attractive isotope of plutonium for weapons 
purposes, all plutonium is considered weapons usable. The only international safeguards 
exemption by the IAEA on plutonium is plutonium containing over 80% 238Pu (11). This is 
primarily due to the high alpha decay heat of 238Pu. This limit is well above the typical 
concentration of 238Pu found in used nuclear fuel and doesn’t exclude any plutonium found 
in used nuclear fuel. 
HEU is uranium with a 235U concentration ≥20% (11). HEU is obtained through the 
enrichment of natural uranium (0.711 wt. % 235U). This material is not as fissile as 
plutonium, but is still a significant threat for weaponization. Although HEU is considered 
direct use nuclear material, an additional classification for uranium, weapons grade, is 
especially important when considering weaponization. Weapons grade uranium is uranium 
having approximately >90 wt. % 235U. 
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1.3.2. Contributions to Material Attractiveness 
 Material attractiveness is constantly debated within the nuclear nonproliferation 
community. In simplistic terms, a material’s attractiveness is a measure of how attractive 
that material is for weapons purposes. Several physical characteristics of a nuclear material 
contribute to the material’s attractiveness. 
 This debate is often centered on plutonium. Although the proliferation of uranium is 
possible, a plutonium weapon requires less mass and plutonium can be found in all used 
nuclear fuel. The three main properties of plutonium that is of proliferation concern are the 
bare critical mass, spontaneous fission neutron rate, and heat generation (12). The bare 
critical mass is important as it is related to the amount of mass required to weaponized the 
material. The spontaneous fission neutron rate is important as it impacts the functionality 
of the weapon. As the implosion occurs, a higher neutron emission rate in the fissile 
material can stop the implosion before the optimal implosion has occurred thus reducing 
the yield of the weapon (13). The heat generation within a weapon can cause problems 
within the high explosives and other materials. An additional property that should be 
considered is the radiation dose from a material. 
 The radiation dose from the materials can have a negative impact on the high 
explosives within a weapon as well as anyone responsible for handling the material. In 
order to understand the effects of radiation dose, a brief summary of radiation dose units is 
needed. There are two main types of radiation doses typically discussed; absorbed dose 
and dose equivalent. Absorbed dose quantifies the amount of radiation absorbed within the 
matter. The units used for this type of dose are gray (Gy) and rad. One Gy is equivalent to 
100 rad. In terms of energy deposition, one gray is equivalent to one J/kg. Dose equivalent 
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incorporates the biological effects of each radiation type through weighting factors. The 
units used for this type of dose are Sievery (Sy) and rem. One Sv is equivalent to 100 rem 
(6). For the sake of simplicity, this study will focus on absorbed dose. 
 The explosives within a nuclear weapon will begin to degrade once a high enough 
dose has been given. This degradation will reduce the effectiveness of the high explosives 
by reducing the detonation velocity (14). This reduction in the explosive potential of the 
high explosives will lead to a reduced yield in the weapon. 
 The effect of the dose rate on humans can be best understood in terms of whole 
body dose. The whole body dose is the dose to the entire body without considering a 
specific section of the body. When the dose rate is relatively high, lethal acute syndromes 
can be considered. Three of these syndromes to be used in this study are central nervous 
system (CNS) syndrome, gastrointestinal (GI) syndrome, and Haemopoietic syndrome. CNS 
syndrome progresses from drowsiness to lethargy. After several hours, seizures begin and 
eventually loss of control of bodily movements occur. Death occurs within 2-3 days. GI 
syndrome consists of severe vomiting and diarrhea. This leads to serious dehydration. GI 
syndrome typically leads to death within 2-3 weeks. Haemopoietic syndrome is the slowest 
progress of the three. Initially slight nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur within the 
first 6-12 hours after exposure. However, these symptoms may subside for up to three 
weeks. The patient may feel healthy until headache, fever, and fatigue begin. This worsens 
until the condition proves lethal after 1-2 months (15). Table 1.1 shows the minimum dose 
thresholds for the three acute radiation syndromes. 
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Table 1.1: Minimum Dose for Acute Radiation Syndromes (15) * (16) 
Syndrome Minimum Dose Required [Gy] 
CNS 50 
GI 5 
Haemopoietic 0.7* 
  
 A more general method to determine the lethality of a dose is to consider the mean 
lethal dose. The lethal dose required for death in 50% of exposed individuals is 
represented as the LD50. Various time intervals can be related to this dose such as 15, 30, 
and 60 days. This will utilize the 60-day time interval. This is represented as the LD50/60. 
According to the Center for Disease Control, the LD50/60 is approximately 2.5 to 5 Gy (16). 
 In addition to the LD 50/60 other dose thresholds can be considered. The radiation 
safety standards in the United States are set by the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). For simplicity, the doses considered in this study are total effective 
dose equivalent. The NRC’s annual limit for the occupational dose of an adult is 5 rem (17). 
An additional safety limit is the “self-protecting” dose rate of 500 rad/h at 1 meter (18). 
This dose rate limit represents a threshold above which the material is considered 
practically unusable for any purpose. This limit is often referred to in terms of material 
attractiveness for weapon’s purposes, rather than within the scope of the material’s use in 
a civilian nuclear fuel cycle. 
1.4. 238Pu Unattractive Features 
 Elevating the concentration of 238Pu will decrease the material attractiveness of the 
plutonium material. This strategy takes advantage of the high alpha decay heat if 238Pu. 
Elevated decay heat introduces significant difficulties in handling and weaponizing the 
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material (19). Increased temperature within a hypothetical nuclear explosive device 
(HNED) can cause the high explosives to self-explode once a particular temperature is 
reached (20). As shown in Table 1.2, 238Pu has a high decay heat per unit mass than the 
other plutonium isotopes. These values have been calculated using data from the Korean 
Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) (21). 
Table 1.2: Decay Heat Contributions of Pu Isotopes [W/kg] 
Isotope α β 
238Pu 557.43 - 
239Pu 1.88 - 
240Pu 6.94 - 
241Pu - 3.22 
242Pu 0.11 - 
  
 In addition to the high alpha decay heat of 238Pu, the spontaneous fission neutron 
generation rate is unattractive for weapons purposes. A high spontaneous fission neutron 
generation rate within an HNED can cause the HNED to detonate prematurely before 
maximum compression is achieved resulting in a lower yield (22). As shown in Table 1.3, 
the even numbered plutonium isotopes have higher spontaneous fission neutron 
generation rates with 238Pu having the highest. Although not often mentioned when 
discussing plutonium, the dose rate from the elevated 238Pu concentration may also 
contribute to its material attractiveness. This has not been thoroughly investigated and 
could play an important role in decreasing the material attractiveness of plutonium in used 
fuel. 
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Table 1.3: Spontaneous Fission Neutron Generation Rate of Pu Isotopes [n/s/g] (23) 
Isotope n/s/g 
238Pu 2.59·103 
239Pu 2.18·10-2 
240Pu 1.02·103 
241Pu 5.00·10-2 
242Pu 1.72·103 
 
1.5. Possible Production Routes for 238Pu 
 Higher 238Pu concentration in used nuclear fuel can be achieved using a few 
methods. The most common is burning fuel with a higher concentration of 235U than 
typically in reactor grade uranium at a high burnup. Figure 1.1 shows the production route 
of 238Pu via 235U. 
 
Figure 1.1: 238Pu Production by way of 235U 
 In addition to 235U, 237Np and 241Am can also be used (24). These isotopes can be 
mixed with fresh fuel and burned in a reactor to produce higher concentrations of 238Pu in 
used nuclear fuel. Figure 1 shows the production route using 237Np. Figure 1.2 shows the 
production route using 241Am. 
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Figure 1.2:  238Pu Production by way of 241Am 
1.6. 232U Unattractive Features 
 Mixing 232U with naturally occurring uranium isotopes can decrease the material 
attractiveness. The unattractive features of 232U are two-fold. The initial alpha decay of 232U 
is relatively high and over time the dose rate and decay heat of the material increases (25). 
This increase in dose rate over time is due to the build-up of 208Tl, which emits an energetic 
gamma ray with energy of 2.615 MeV. Not only is the dose rate a danger to anyone who 
may handle the material, but also can damage the high explosives of a weapon. Over time, 
energy deposition by gamma radiation within the high explosives may cause them to 
degrade leading to reduced effectiveness (14). Table 4 shows the decay heat contributions 
and half-lives of the uranium isotopes (21). The decay heat of 232U is notable in comparison 
to the naturally occurring uranium isotopes. Also, worth noting is the half-life of 232U, which 
is several orders of magnitude shorter than that of the naturally occurring uranium 
isotopes. 
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Table 1.4: Decay Heat Contribution and Half-lives of U Isotopes 
Isotope α-Decay Heat [W/kg] 
Half-life 
[years] 
232U 703 68.9 
234U 0.176 2.45·105 
235U 5.63·10-5 7.04·108 
238U 8.35·10-6 4.47·109 
 
 In order to understand how the decay heat and dose rate change over time, the 
decay chain of 232U must be considered. As shown in Figure 1.3, the daughter products of 
232U have relatively short half-lives and 208Tl builds up rapidly. The decay chain progresses 
rapidly upon the decay of 228Th. 
 
  Figure 1.3: 232U Decay Chain 
 Table 1.5 shows the decay heat per unit mass of 232U’s daughter products. Although 
the daughter products are present in fractional amounts, they produce high enough decay 
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heat to greatly increase the total decay heat of the material over time. Both the decay heat 
and dose rate reach a maximum after approximately 10 years (25). 
Table 1.5: 232U Daughter Products Decay Heat 
Isotope W/kg 
228Th 2.63·104 
224Ra 5.36·106 
220Rn 3.44·1010 
216Po 1.45·1013 
212Pb 8.25·105 
212Bi 2.32·108 
208Tl 9.82·108 
212Po 9.27·1018 
 
 In addition to the decay heat and dose rate, 232U poses a significant obstacle for the 
enrichment process (26). Without utilizing isotopic separation technology, 232U cannot be 
separated from the uranium material. The main purpose of the enrichment of natural 
uranium is to increase the concentration of 235U and decrease the concentration of 238U 
making the material more fissile. Although the concentration of 234U is also increased, the 
initial concentration of 234U is so low that it is not an impact. However, the significant mass 
difference between 232U and 235U (three neutrons) would cause the concentration of 232U to 
greatly increase during the enrichment process. This would increase the effects of heat 
generation and dose rate as the material is enriched. The emission of alpha particles in 
gaseous UF6 poses an additional threat to the enrichment process (26). When UF6 
molecules are irradiated with alpha particles, the molecules may decompose through the 
creation of ion pairs. Historically, this issue was considered through the scope of the effects 
of 234U’s alpha decay in gaseous UF6 (27). 232U’s effects will be significantly more notable as 
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its alpha emission rate is higher than that of 234U. Table 1.6 shows the alpha emission rates 
of 232U and the naturally occurring uranium isotopes. 
Table 1.6: Alpha Emission Rate of U Isotopes 
Isotope 
Alpha 
Emission Rate 
[α/s/g] 
232U 8.28·1011 
234U 2.31·108 
235U 8.00·104 
238U 1.24·104 
 
 Although not typically mentioned when referencing uranium, the spontaneous 
fission neutron rate of 232U may increase the detectability of uranium materials containing 
232U. Neutrons are often more difficult to shield than gamma rays and may allow for the 
detection of these materials in situations where gamma ray measurements may not. Table 
1.7 shows the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of 232U and the naturally 
occurring uranium isotopes. Although these values are smaller than that of the even 
numbered plutonium isotopes, the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of 232U is 
notable as it would allow for increased detection ability. 
Table 1.7: Spontaneous Fission Neutron Generation Rate of U Isotopes (23) 
Isotope 
Spontaneous 
Fission 
Neutron Rate 
[n/(s⋅kg)] 
232U 1300 
234U 5.02 
235U 0.299 
238U 13.6 
 
16 
 
 In addition to spontaneous fission neutrons, uranium materials that include 232U in 
an oxide matrix (such as UO2) will release a higher number of (α,n) neutrons. (α,n) 
neutrons are produced when an alpha particle reacts with an atom (such as oxygen) and 
releases a neutron. Table 1.8 shows the (α,n) neutron generation rate of 232U and the 
naturally occurring uranium isotopes. Considering 232U’s high alpha particle emission rate, 
its presence in UO2 creates orders of magnitude more (α,n) neutrons than naturally 
occurring uranium isotopes. 
Table 1.8: (α,n) Neutron Generation Rate of U Isotopes (23) 
Isotope (α,n) Neutron Rate [n/(s⋅kg)] 
232U 1.49·107 
234U 3.00·103 
235U 7.10·10-1 
238U 8.30·10-2 
 
1.7. Possible Production Routes for 232U 
 Although this study will not focus specifically on producing 232U, proposing and 
highlighting possible production routes is essential to understanding the feasibility of the 
proposed use of 232U. Historically, 232U has been discussed as it relates to thorium fuel 
cycles. When natural thorium, containing mostly 232Th, is irradiated by neutrons, 233U is 
produced containing fractional amounts of 232U. 232Th absorbs a neutron producing 233Th, 
which then beta decays to 233Pa. 233Pa then beta decays to 233U, an isotope whose fissile 
capabilities are more like plutonium than 235U. An (n,2n) reaction with 233Th, 233Pa, or 233U, 
will lead to the production of 232U (28). This production route is not useful for the method 
proposed in this study. Only fractional amounts of 232U are produced with most of the 
uranium produced being 233U. These isotopes would be difficult to separate as doing so 
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would require isotopic separation technology. The production route needed here should 
produce mainly 232U. 
 Producing 232U specifically can be done by utilizing 230Th and 231Pa (29). 230Th and 
231Pa are both found in nature in fractional amounts. Figure 1.4 show the production route 
for 232U. 
 
Figure 1.4: Production Route for 232U 
1.8. Material Properties 
 This section will discuss the material properties of both plutonium and uranium. 
1.8.1. Plutonium Material Properties 
 This study will analyze plutonium in metallic form as this is the most attractive for 
weapons purposes. Plutonium has a several solid phases with various densities. Figure 1.5 
shows the solid phases of plutonium as a function of density and temperature. 
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Figure 1.5: Plutonium phases (30) 
 The delta phase is most attractive for weapons purposes (20), but is not stable at 
room temperature. In order to stabilize delta phase plutonium at room temperature and 
across a wide range of temperatures, a small percentage (5 at.%) of gallium can be added. 
Figure 1.6 shows the plutonium-gallium phase diagram (31). 
 
Figure 1.6: Plutonium-Gallium Phase Diagram (31) 
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 The crystal structure of delta phase plutonium is a face-centered cubic. Delta phase 
plutonium has a density of 15.8 g/cm3. Table 1.9 shows the thermophysical properties of 
plutonium used in this study. 
Table 1.9: Thermophysical Properties of Plutonium (30) (31) 
Thermal 
Conductivity 
[W/m·K] 
Heat 
Capacity 
[J/g·K] 
Modulus of 
Elasticity 
[GPa] 
Thermal 
Expansion 
[1/K] 
Tensile 
Strength 
[GPa] 
10.97 0.13 68 3.00·10-6 1.00·10-1 
 
1.8.2. Uranium Material Properties 
 Uranium will be considered in several material form; metallic, UO2 powder, and 
sintered UO2. The metallic form is considerably less complicated than in the case of 
plutonium. Metallic uranium has three solid phases; α, β, and γ. α phase is stable under 669 
°C so this is the phase considered here. α phase uranium has an orthorhombic crystal 
structure with a density of 19.05 g/cm3. 
Table 1.10: Thermophysical Properties of Uranium (30) 
Thermal 
Conductivity 
[W/(m·K)] 
Heat 
Capacity 
[J/(g·K)] 
Modulus of 
Elasticity 
[GPa] 
Thermal 
Expansion 
[1/K] 
Tensile 
Strength 
[GPa] 
28.9 0.1163 190 1.39·10-5 0.615 
 
 UO2 is not attractive for weapons purposes but is found in nuclear fuel cycles as fuel. 
Initially, UO2 may be stored as a powder and later sintered. Powder UO2 has an 
approximate density of 2.5 g/cm3. Sintered UO2 has a density of 10.96 g/cm3 (30). The 
thermophysical properties previously described are not needed for the analysis of UO2 
done here. 
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1.8.3. Additional Material Properties 
 In addition to the thermophysical properties of the fissile material, that of the other 
materials found in the HNED is also needed. The high explosives chosen to analyze is PBX 
9502. PBX 9502 is a polymer bonded explosive that has a self-explosion temperature of 
331 °C, starts pyrolysis at 395 °C, and melts at 448 °C. Table 1.11 shows the densities for 
the HNED materials. 
Table 1.11: HNED Material Densities ** (20) 
Material 
Density 
(30) 
[g/cm3] 
References 
Be 1.85 (30) 
PBX 9502 1.90** (20) 
Al casing 2.7 (30) 
 
 Table 1.12 shows the thermophysical properties of the additional HNED materials. 
Table 1.12: Thermophysical Properties of HNED Materials (30), (32), (33), (34), (35), (36) 
Material 
Thermal 
Conductivity 
[W/m·K] 
Heat 
Capacity 
[J/g·K] 
Modulus of 
Elasticity 
[GPa] 
Thermal 
Expansion 
[1/K] 
Tensile 
Strength [GPa] 
Be 102 1.78 303 1.60·10-5 1.90·10-1 
PBX 
9502 0.5607 1.125 15.3 4.01·10
-6 3.23·10-3 
Al casing 98ᶧ 1.177 17 2.30·10-5 4.80·10-1 
  
 The properties affecting the radiation and convective heat transfer at the surface of 
the models must be considered. The radiation heat transfer will be assumed to be that of a 
black body as this produces the best case for the heat transfer and is a limiting case. Table 
1.13 shows the convective heat transfer coefficients for air and liquid nitrogen. 
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Table 1.13: Convective Heat Transfer Coefficients [W/cm2·K] (37) (38) 
Fluid 
Convective Heat 
Transfer 
Coefficient 
Air 0.001 
Liquid Nitrogen 0.01 
 
1.9. Layout of Dissertation 
 This dissertation is made up of five chapters. The second chapter describes the 
previous studies that serve as the basis and background for this dissertation. These studies 
span several techniques for evaluating the attractiveness of both plutonium and uranium 
materials for weapons purposes. The third chapter describes the methodology used in this 
study. This methodology consists of a model based approach and figure of merit approach 
for both plutonium and uranium materials. In addition, an analysis to evaluate the 
practicality of the implementation of the uranium material in the civilian world. The fourth 
chapter reports and discusses the results from the methods described in Chapter 3. The 
fifth chapter concludes the dissertation. This chapter not only summarizes and concludes 
the plutonium and uranium analyses, but also elaborates on the scope of the final 
conclusions and describes possible future works.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Quantifying proliferation resistance is a complex task. In particular, when 
referencing the proliferation resistance of a specific material, making an accurate 
assessment can be open to interpretation. Historically, proliferation resistance assessments 
have varied greatly. This section will discuss three specific analyses used to assess 
proliferation resistance of nuclear materials. 
2.1. Modeling Based Analysis 
 This section shall describe the use of a specific model in order to assess the material 
attractiveness and proliferation resistance of the fissile material. These studies investigated 
plutonium vectors with elevated 238Pu content. Two similar studies are worth discussing to 
illustrate their methodology and possible shortfalls. 
 Dr. Kessler of the Technical University of Karlsruhe in Germany has published his 
work in regards to denaturing plutonium using 238Pu. Kessler analyzed 8 plutonium vectors 
having 238Pu concentrations ranging from 1.6% to 24.5%. He created three simple 
hypothetical spherical fission type nuclear weapon models representing high, medium, and 
low technology. Each model had varying thicknesses of high explosives and reflectors, with 
the high technology having the thinnest and the low technology having the thickest. Figure 
2.1 shows the three simplistic models. Each model is spherically symmetric. 
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Figure 2.1: Kessler's Models (20) 
 The plutonium masses for each vector were chosen in order to give the model a keff 
of 0.98. Using steady state heat transfer through the model, the temperature throughout 
each layer was determined. The temperature within the high explosives were compared to 
the “self-explosion” temperature of the high explosives to determine if the weapon would 
self-explode. Kessler concluded that plutonium vectors containing approximately 6% 238Pu 
or more would result in the self-explosion temperature being reached even in the high 
technology case (20). 
 Using the models shown in Figure 2.1, a group from the Research Laboratory from 
Nuclear Reactors at the Tokyo Institute of Technology analyzed the temperature within the 
high explosives as a function of 238Pu concentration. Rather than analyze a few specific 
plutonium vectors, they sought to relate the maximum temperature in the high explosives 
to the concentration of 238Pu. Their final conclusion was that 238Pu above 15% would be 
infeasible in the high technology case, above 6% in the medium technology case, and above 
2% in the low technology case (19). The 15% is a significantly higher concentration of 
238Pu than that the 6% proposed by Kessler. 
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 Although these studies were able to make conclusions regarding how the 238Pu 
concentration impacts the three models, the scope of these studies are narrow and only 
draw conclusions in regards to those specific models. These studies fail to make a more 
broad assessment of material attractiveness. The plutonium vectors analyzed by Kessler 
aren’t necessarily realistic. These vectors were obtained at high burnups that do not 
represent what is currently standard in the nuclear fuel cycle. Another major issue is that 
the results are heavily dependent on the models. Any deviation in the models (ex. changes 
in the high explosives type or thickness) will change the results. Also, these models do not 
represent a limiting case. A keff of 0.98 is close to critical (keff=1) and the weapon essentially 
has nearly a maximal plutonium mass without being critical. A nearly maximal plutonium 
mass would then produce a nearly maximal heat generation. In order for the model to be a 
limiting case, the keff must be minimal in order to minimize the mass and heat generation 
while still being a functional HNED. 
2.2. Figure of Merit Analysis 
 In order to broaden the assessment of material attractiveness, a Figure of Merit 
(FOM) analysis is useful. A group led by Charles Bathke at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory developed a FOM that serves as a metric for attractiveness (18). An important 
note of this study is its definition of proliferation resistance. Proliferation resistance is 
defined as the characteristics of a material to impeded diversion of nuclear material by a 
state. This definition excluded any non-state entities such as terrorist organization. Non-
state entities are not considered in the analysis. The state entities considered in this study 
are separated into two categories: technically advanced states and less technically 
advanced states. 
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This analysis uses physical characteristics of a material as inputs and output a FOM 
value that measures the material’s attractiveness. These physical characteristics are the 
bare critical mass, the heat generation, the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate, 
and the dose rate. These are seen as the four main properties of a material that determine 
its attractiveness for weapons purposes. Each characteristic is represented by a factor that 
is normalized to accepted standards. The bare critical mass factor is normalized to the 
threshold for low enriched uranium (<20% 235U). The heat generation factor is normalized 
to the international safeguards limit for 238Pu concentration (80% 238Pu). The spontaneous 
fission neutron generation rate factor is normalized to reactor grade plutonium (≥20% 
240Pu). The dose rate factor is normalized to a “self-protecting” dose rate of 500 rad/h at 1 
meter. For technically advanced states, the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate 
factor is excluded as a technically advanced state can handle a high neutron generation rate 
within a weapon and avoid pre-detonation. All four factors are included in the case of less 
technically advanced states. Equation 2.1 shows the FOM for less technically advanced 
states (FOM1). Equation 2.2 shows the FOM for technically advanced states (FOM2). In these 
equations the FOM is related to the bare critical mass in units of kg (M), the heat generation 
in units of W/kg (h), the spontaneous fission neutron rate in units of neutrons/s/kg (S), 
and the dose rate in units of rad/h (D). 
Equation 2.1 
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Equation 2.2 
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 The FOM is separated into ranges that relate the value to the material’s weapons 
utility and attractiveness. Table 2.1 shows these ranges. 
Table 2.1: FOM Ranges and Material Attractiveness 
FOM Weapons Utility Attractiveness 
> 2 Preferred High 
1-2 Attractive Medium 
0-1 Unattractive Low 
< 0 Unattractive Very Low 
 
 Bathke applies this FOM to a variety of materials to quantify their attractiveness 
(18). The FOM analysis makes a broader statement about material attractiveness than the 
model based analysis as it doesn’t apply to a specific situation but rather the material in 
any situation. However, this analysis is only useful for direct use material in a weapon’s 
usable form (i.e. metal). Any potential process such as conversion from one chemical form 
to another or enrichment is excluded from this analysis. For example, if considering a 
uranium vector, the FOM would result in unattractive if the 235U enrichment were below 
20%. However, if the same material were enriched, the FOM would change. The 
infrastructure required to convert an unattractive material to an attractive one is not 
possessed by every state and should be accounted for. Also, how the material might affect 
these processes is important when determining the material’s attractiveness. 
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2.3. Broader Approaches 
 In the case of 232U proliferation resistance analyses, studies have been broad and 
somewhat ambiguous. Considering 232U is currently found in thorium fuel cycles, previous 
studies were done on 232U/233U mixtures. As natural thorium is irradiated with neutrons, 
233U is created with fractional amount of 232U as a result of (n,2n) reactions. 
 A study done at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by Dr. Moir attempted to 
analyze the proliferation resistant features of 232U/233U mixtures. The study shows the 
major increase in heat generation and dose rate over time from the daughter products of 
232U. Both reaching a maximum after approximately 10 years. This study also introduces 
the impact of radiation damage to high explosives. A high explosive can withstand 100 MR, 
equivalent to 0.877 Mrads and 0.00877 MGy, before degrading (14). However, the study 
only evaluates the dose rate from 1 meter rather than analyzing the dose given to high 
explosive within a realistic model. Without a realistic model, the study ignores the photon 
attenuation that would occur within the layers of the model. 
 Another study evaluates denaturing 20% 235U uranium materials with 232U (26). 
This study mentions the increase in dose rate, but focuses mostly on the increase in the 
neutron yield. The neutron yield is significantly larger than that of a uranium material 
containing natural uranium isotopes and would allow for detection via neutron detectors. 
This study also mentions the effect of alpha decay within gaseous UF6. UF6 molecules are 
destroyed by the irradiation of alpha particles. The study concludes that 48% of UF6 
molecules are destroyed in one tenth of a year. However, the analysis is difficult to follow 
and not rigorous. A considerable percentage of UF6 molecules being destroyed would pose 
a serious barrier to uranium enrichment. Since the separation of isotopes are driven by 
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mass differences, the lighter molecules created from the destruction of UF6 molecules 
would be counterproductive to the enrichment process. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Heat Transfer Theory 
 This study analyzes conductive heat transfer throughout multiple shells of several 
spherically symmetric HNED models in       order to calculate the temperature profiles 
throughout each shell. Equation 3.1 shows the complete conductive heat transfer equation 
in spherical coordinates (37). In this equation, the temperature in units of K (T) is related 
to the radius in units of m (r), time in units of s (t), the angle with respect to the x-axis in 
units of radian (θ), the angle with respect to the z-axis in units of radian (ф), the thermal 
conductivity in units of W/(m·K) (k), the density in units of kg/m3 (ρ), the heat capacity in 
units of J/K (Cp), and the heat generation in units of W (ġ). 
Equation 3.1 
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 Considering all of the models considered here are spherically symmetric, all partial 
derivatives with respect to θ and ф are equal to 0. The simplified version of the heat 
equation is shown in Equation 3.2. 
Equation 3.2 
1
𝑟𝑟2
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟2
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
� + ?̇?𝑔 = 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 
3.1.1. Steady State Conductive Heat Transfer 
 In the steady state case (no time dependence), Equation 3.2 is simplified to Equation 
3.3. 
Equation 3.3 
1
𝑟𝑟2
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟2
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
� + ?̇?𝑔 = 0 
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 Equation 3.3 is solved analytically for two cases; with heat generation (ġ≠0) and 
without heat generation (ġ=0). Equation 3.4 shows the temperature profile within a shell 
that is generating heat. This equation relates the temperature (T) with the outer 
temperature (To), the inner radius (ri), the outer radius (ro), the heat generation (ġ), the 
thermal conductivity (k), and the radius (r). 
Equation 3.4 
𝜕𝜕(𝑟𝑟) = −
?̇?𝑔𝑟𝑟2
6𝑘𝑘
−
?̇?𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖3
3𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟
+
?̇?𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜2
6𝑘𝑘
+
?̇?𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖3
3𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜
+ 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜 
 Equation 3.5 shows the temperature profile with a shell that is not generating heat.  
Equation 3.5 
𝜕𝜕(𝑟𝑟) =  
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 − 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜)
𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)
−
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 − 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜)
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜 
3.1.2. Transient Conductive Heat Transfer 
 Considering the complexity in attempting to solve Equation 3.2 analytically, 
discretizing the equation is a simpler way to analyze the transient conductive heat transfer. 
In to discretize, the partial derivate with respect to the radius must be expanded. Equation 
3.6 shows the expanded equation. 
Equation 3.6 
2𝑘𝑘
𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
+ 𝑘𝑘
𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟2
+ ?̇?𝑔 = 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 
 Each term is discretized using a forward finite difference discretization (39). 
Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8 show the forward finite difference discretization of the first 
derivative with respect to r and t. Equation 3.9 shows the central forward difference 
discretization of the second derivative with respect to r. i corresponds to the ith node. j 
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corresponds to the jth node. Δr is the step size in the radial direction. Δt is the step size in 
time. 
Equation 3.7 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
=
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖+1
𝑗𝑗 − 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
Δ𝑟𝑟
 
Equation 3.8 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
=
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗+1 − 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
Δ𝜕𝜕
 
Equation 3.9 
𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟2
=
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖+1
𝑗𝑗 − 2𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 + 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖−1
𝑗𝑗
Δ𝑟𝑟2
 
 Equation 3.10 shows Equation 3.6 with Equation 3.7, Equation 3.8, and Equation 3.9 
substituted for each of the derivative terms. This equation is solved for the temperature at 
the j+1 time step. Matlab will be used to model this equation. 
Equation 3.10 
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗+1 =
kΔ𝜕𝜕
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝Δ𝑟𝑟
�
2
𝑟𝑟
�𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖+1
𝑗𝑗 − 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗� +
1
Δ𝑟𝑟
�𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖+1
𝑗𝑗 − 2𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 + 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖−1
𝑗𝑗 �� + 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 +
?̇?𝑔Δ𝜕𝜕
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝
 
 Equation 3.11 shows the only stability criteria for Equation 3.10. 
Equation 3.11 
𝑘𝑘Δ𝜕𝜕
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝Δ𝑟𝑟2
<
1
2
 
3.1.3. Boundary Conditions 
 In order to analyze the heat transfer throughout the entire models, the boundary 
conditions must be used. The first boundary condition is the thermal energy transferred at 
each boundary is the same, because only the inner most shell is generating heat. At the 
outermost layer, the thermal energy is transferred via natural convection and radiation. 
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Equation 3.12 shows the relationship between the thermal energy in units of W (Q� ) and the 
surface temperature in units of K (Ts), the temperature of the surroundings in units of K 
(Tsurr), the temperature of the surrounding wall in units of K (T∞), the surface area in units 
of m2 (A), the convective heat transfer coefficient in units of W/(m2·K) (h), the radiative 
heat transfer coefficient (ε), and the Stefan-Boltzmann constant in units of W/(m2·K4) (σ). 
Equation 3.12 
?̇?𝑄 = 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴(𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠4 − 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠4 ) + ℎ𝐴𝐴(𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 − 𝜕𝜕∞) 
 In addition to the first boundary condition, the temperature throughout the model is 
assumed continuous. Although in reality slight air gaps between the shells may be present, 
these air gaps would raise the temperature in the outer shells. Therefor assuming perfect 
heat conduction between each shell is the best case for heat transfer and would yield the 
lowest temperature profile. This serves as the limiting case for this analysis. Since the 
models are spherically symmetric, the shells are treated as parts of a thermal resistance 
circuit. Equation 3.13 shows the expression of the thermal energy.  Since the temperature 
profile is continuous, the outer temperature of a shell is equal to the inner temperature of 
the next shell. 
Equation 3.13 
?̇?𝑄 =
4𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 − 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜)
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
 
 When considering time dependence, the boundary conditions are the same. 
However, the shells are not treated as parts of a thermal circuit, but rather Fourier’s law is 
used as an additional boundary condition. Equation 3.14 shows the convective and 
radiation boundary condition at the outermost boundary of the model. 
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Equation 3.14 
𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟
= 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀(𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠4 − 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠4 ) + ℎ(𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 − 𝜕𝜕∞) 
 Equation 3.15 shows Fourier’s law at the interface. In this equation, km is the 
thermal conductivity of the mth shell, kn is the thermal conductivity of the nth shell, Tm is the 
temperature profile within the mth shell, Tn is the temperature profile within the nth shell, 
and rint is the radius at the interface. 
Equation 3.15 
𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚
𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛
𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
3.1.4. Thermal Stress 
 Considering the temperature increases, thermal stresses will be experienced in the 
shells due to thermal expansion. As the temperature increases in the shells, they will 
expand. Since the shells are fixed and won’t be allowed to expand, the shells will experience 
thermal stress. Equation 3.16 shows thermal stress (σT), Young’s Modulus of Elasticity (E), 
the temperature difference (ΔT), and the linear thermal expansion coefficient (α). 
Equation 3.16 
𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸 ∙ Δ𝜕𝜕 ∙ 𝛼𝛼 
3.2. Plutonium Analysis 
3.2.1. Plutonium Vector 
 In order to obtain a realistic plutonium vector, a real world fuel design must be 
used. An innovative metallic fuel design from Lightbridge (40) will produce elevated 238Pu 
content in its used fuel. Previously, the Lightbridge fuel has been referred to as 
“proliferation resistant” (41) and may achieve a significant concentration of 238Pu to 
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decrease material attractiveness. Lightbridge fuel has an initial high 235U enrichment 
(19.7% 235U) and relatively high fuel burnup (191 MWd/kg). 
 Using ORIGEN2 software, the Lightbridge fuel was simulated for a pressurized 
water reactor. Table 3.1 shows the resulting plutonium vector (42). 
Table 3.1: Plutonium Vector 
Isotope wt. % 
238Pu 18.14 
239Pu 35.66 
240Pu 21.08 
241Pu 13.54 
242Pu 11.58 
 
 The plutonium will be alloyed with 5 at. % gallium and has a density of 15.8 g/cm3. 
3.2.2. Modeling Based Analysis 
3.2.2.1. Models 
 Kessler’s high technology model will be used initially to redo Kessler’s analysis 
using the plutonium vector in Table 3.2 and updated material properties. Updated decay 
heat contributions from each plutonium vector will be used to ensure the correct amount 
of heat generation is being analyzed. The results can then be compared to Kessler’s. 
Table 3.2: Kessler's Plutonium Vector 
Isotope wt. % 
238Pu 8.7 
239Pu 30.1 
240Pu 30.6 
241Pu 11.3 
242Pu 19.3 
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 In addition, this analysis will use two models for the steady state heat transfer 
analysis. The most realistic of these models will be used for the transient heat transfer 
analysis. Each model will be slightly modified to maintain the keff when the plutonium 
vector in Table 3.1 is used. The keff for each model is found using kcode within the software 
MCNP (43). 
 Model One is based on Fat Man. Fat Man is the only plutonium based nuclear 
weapon used in warfare and thus represents a logical realistic case to consider. The 
geometry of the model is well known. The keff of the original design is 0.98. Table 3.3 shows 
the radial thickness of each shell in the initial Fat Man geometry (4) and the updated 
geometry (42). Pu is plutonium. Unat is natural uranium. BPE is borated polyethylene. Al is 
aluminum. PBX 9502 is the polymer bonded explosives. The updated geometry contains 
more plutonium mass because the original geometry contained weapons grade plutonium 
rather than the less fissile plutonium vector used in the updated geometry. The borated 
polyethylene was removed from the updated geometry as the heat produced by the 
plutonium would melt it. 
Table 3.3: Model One Initial and Updated Geometries 
Material 
Radial Thickness 
[cm] 
Initial Updated 
Neutron 
Initiator 1 - 
Pu 3.6 5.105 
Unat 6.5 5 
BPE 0.33 - 
Al 12.07 12.40 
PBX 9502 47 47 
Steel casing 1 1 
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 Although this design is relatively large, Model One represents a limiting case. The 
larger outer surface area of the geometry will lead to a reduction in the temperatures 
within the materials. 
 Model Two is considered to be the most realistic design. This model features a 
minimum amount of plutonium and has a significantly lower keff than Model One. The lower 
plutonium mass will generate less heat and represents an important limiting case. The keff 
of Model Two is 0.66. The only change between the initial and updated models is the 
expansion of the plutonium shell inward. Table 3.4 shows the radial thickness of each shell 
in the initial model (44) and the updated model (42). 
Table 3.4: Model Two Initial and Updated Geometries 
Material 
Radial Thickness 
[cm] 
Initial Updated 
Inner 
cavity 4.25 3.715 
Pu 0.75 1.285 
Be 2 2 
Udep 3 3 
PBX 9502 10 10 
Al casing 1 1 
 
3.2.2.2. Steady State Heat Transfer 
 The temperature will be found analytically for each model using the theory 
described in the Steady State Conductive Heat Transfer section. The temperature within 
the high explosives will be compared to its self-explosion temperature to assess whether 
self-explosion will occur. 
 Although the α and β decay heat from each plutonium isotope has previously been 
assumed to be the main contributor to the heat generation, other decay heat contributor 
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will be considered. The heat generation due to gamma rays and spontaneous fission 
(including gamma rays, neutrons, fission fragments, and induced fission) will be considered 
in each layer. The gamma ray emissions from the plutonium will found using the software 
RadSrc. RadSrc takes radionuclide content and age in years as inputs and outputs the 
decayed content as an MCNP usable gamma ray emission spectrum (45). MCNP is then 
used to find the energy deposition from the sources previously described with the 
exception of the fission fragments. The energy deposition from the fission fragments is 
found using the average energy of the fission fragments (46). 
3.2.2.3. Transient Heat Transfer 
 Although a steady state transfer analysis will determine if the heat generation is 
significant enough to cause the high explosives to reach its self-explosion temperature, this 
analysis will not yield a time limit at which this temperature is met. This information is 
crucial as it serves as a time window within which the model is usable even with the 
increased heat generation. In order to find this limit, a transient heat transfer model must 
be used. 
 Matlab is used to create a computational model of the most realistic model (Model 
Two). The theory described in the Transient Conductive Heat Transfer section will be used 
to “step” through time and space to create the temperature throughout the model over 
time. The changes in temperature over time will also be used to calculate the maximum 
thermal stress (Equation 3.16) in each of the shells to determine if any deformation or 
failure will occur. Deformation or failure with an HNED would cause a nonuniform 
implosion leading to a reduction in the overall yield and could possibly reduce the weapon 
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to a radiological dispersal device. The transient heat transfer will be considered for four 
unique scenarios (42). 
 In the first scenario, the plutonium pit is inserted into the HNED. Prior to insertion, 
the HNED is at room temperature and the plutonium pit is in thermal equilibrium with the 
surrounding room. Post insertion, the HNED is stationary within a large room and the heat 
is transferred at the surface of the HNED by way of natural convection and radiative heat 
transfer. 
 In the second scenario, the plutonium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen prior 
to insertion. As in scenario 1, the HNED is at room temperature however the plutonium pit 
is in thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen. Post insertion, the HNED is again 
stationary within a large room and the heat is transferred at the surface by way of natural 
convection and radiative heat transfer. 
 In the third scenario, the plutonium pit is inserted into an externally cooled HNED. 
Prior to insertion, the HNED is at thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen surrounding 
it and the plutonium pit is at thermal equilibrium with the surrounding room. Post 
insertion, the HNED remains externally cooled by liquid nitrogen. 
 In the fourth scenario, the fully assembled, liquid nitrogen cooled HNED is removed 
and place into a large room. The initial temperature profile of scenario 4 is the final 
temperature profile of scenario 3. Once the HNED is removed, heat is transferred at its 
surface by way of natural convection and radiative heat transfer. 
3.2.3. Figure of Merit Analysis 
 In order to make a broader statement regarding the plutonium vector’s material 
attractiveness, the FOM described in Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2 will be calculated for 
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this plutonium vector. The resulting FOM values will be compared to the ranges shown in 
Table 2.1. In order to put the results in perspective, the FOM will be calculated for two 
additional plutonium vectors; one from a typical light water reactor (LWR) used fuel and 
the other from mixed oxide (MOX) used fuel. Table 3.5 shows these vectors (47). 
Table 3.5: Addition Plutonium Vectors [wt. %] 
Isotope LWR MOX 
238Pu 2.00 3.17 
239Pu 41.3 43.7 
240Pu 27.6 22.2 
241Pu 19.2 17.0 
242Pu 9.91 13.9 
 
 Each of the four components of the FOM equation: bare critical mass, dose rate, heat 
generation, and spontaneous fission neutron generation rate must be calculated. The bare 
critical mass will be found using kcode within MCNP. The geometry is a bare sphere of 
metallic plutonium surrounded by air. The mass will be slightly modified until the mass is 
critical (keff=1). The heat generation is found by combining the plutonium vectors with the 
decay heat per unit mass of each plutonium isotope. Similarly, the spontaneous fission rate 
is found by combining the plutonium vectors with the spontaneous fission neutron 
generation rate per unit mass of each plutonium isotope. MCNP will be used to find the 
dose rate of 0.2 the bare critical mass from 1 meter. Using the gamma ray spectrum from 
RadSrc for each plutonium vector, MCNP will calculate the dose rate 1 meter from the 
surface of a metallic plutonium sphere having 0.2 the bare critical mass. 
 In addition to calculating the FOM values, contributions from possible sources of 
uncertainty must be accounted for. Although the bare critical mass is found 
computationally using MCNP6, the result is dependent on the cross section libraries chosen 
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for each isotope. Using a technique previously used at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(48), the bare critical mass will be calculated using several cross section libraries. The 
resulting masses will be averaged and their standard deviation is used as the uncertainty. 
The decay heat values are calculated using decay data from KAERI (21) and data used in 
plutonium denaturing studies done by a research groups in Tokyo (24). The spontaneous 
fission values are calculated by using the spontaneous fission rates from the book “Passive 
Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials” (23) and from the studies from the Tokyo 
Institute of Technology mentioned previously (24). As with the bare critical mass values, 
the decay heat values and spontaneous fission values will be averaged and the standard 
deviation will be used as the uncertainty for each. The dose rate is calculated entirely 
computationally in MCNP6 such that the computational uncertainty is negligible. 
3.3. Uranium Analysis 
3.3.1. Uranium Vectors 
 Two unique sets of uranium vectors are used in the analysis. The first set is an initial 
mixture of 232U and natural uranium enriched to various concentrations of 235U for various 
applications. The second set are similar to the first set in terms of 235U enrichment, but do 
not contain 232U and have the same 235U/238U. The second set will be used to illustrate the 
effects of the introduction of 232U on various safety, security and safeguards measurements. 
 For the first set, the initial mixture is 0.029 wt. % 232U and natural uranium. This 
initial mixture was chosen because preliminary calculations concluded that the amount of 
232U when enriched to weapons grade from this initial mixture was sufficient to cause self-
explosion in the high explosives of a HNED model. The mixture is enriched to 
approximately 3, 5, 20, 90 at. % 235U. The 3 and 5 at. % vectors represent reactor grade 
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uranium. The 20 at. % vector represents the limit above which uranium is classified as 
HEU. The 90 at. % vector represents weapons grade uranium. The enrichment of the initial 
vector was simulated via MSTAR. MSTAR is a software program currently developed at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory that takes an initial concentration of the various uranium 
isotope and a final concentration of 235U and outputs the final concentration of the other 
uranium isotopes (49). Table 3.6 shows the uranium vectors that include 232U. 
Table 3.6: Uranium Vectors with 232U [wt. %] 
Isotope Initial 3% 5% 20% 90% 
232U 0.029 0.179 0.310 1.330 6.241 
234U 0.005 0.028 0.043 0.180 0.930 
235U 0.702 2.940 4.741 19.805 89.844 
238U 99.263 96.853 94.706 78.714 2.985 
 
 Table 3.7 shows the uranium vectors that do not include 232U. 
Table 3.7: Uranium Vectors without 232U [wt. %] 
Isotope Initial 3% 5% 20% 90% 
234U 0.005 0.028 0.044 0.183 0.992 
235U 0.702 2.945 4.956 20.066 95.824 
238U 99.292 97.027 95.027 79.751 3.184 
 
 Not only are these fresh uranium vectors to be considered, but also the vectors as 
they age. Considering the relative rapid increase in heat generation and dose rate over 
time, each uranium vector will be analyzed at three time intervals: 0 year, 0.5 year, and 10 
years. The gamma ray spectrum and intensities as well as the isotopic composition of each 
vector is found using RadSrc (45). 
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3.3.2. Model Based Analysis 
3.3.2.1. Model 
 The uranium model based analysis will only utilize one HNED model. This model is 
similar to Model Two in the plutonium analysis. The model is considered realistic as it has a 
minimal amount of uranium mass. Considering this is an HNED model, the “90%” uranium 
vector in Table 3.6 is used. Considering this uranium vector is different than the weapons 
grade uranium originally in the design, the model is slightly modified to maintain the keff. 
According to MCNP’s kcode, the keff of this model is 0.69. Table 3.8 shows the initial (44) 
and update models. The inner cavity contains dry air. The U is the uranium weapons pit. 
The Be is the beryllium. The Udep is depleted uranium. The PBX 9502 is the polymer bonded 
high explosives. The Al casing is the aluminum casing. 
Table 3.8: Uranium HNED Initial and Updated Models 
Material 
Radial Thickness 
[cm] 
Initial Updated 
Inner 
cavity 5.77 5.897 
U 1.23 1.102 
Be 2 2 
Udep 3 3 
PBX 9502 10 10 
Al casing 1 1 
 
3.3.2.2. Steady State Heat Transfer 
 The temperature will be found analytically for the updated model in Table 3.8 using 
the theory described in the Steady State Conductive Heat Transfer section. The 
temperature within the high explosives will be compared to its self-explosion temperature 
to assess whether self-explosion will occur. 
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 Considering the heat generation contributions for sources besides α and β decay are 
calculated in the plutonium steady state heat transfer analysis, these contributions will 
only be included in the uranium analysis if their contributions are significant in comparison 
to the heat generation from α and β decay. Otherwise, these contributions are considered 
negligible. 
3.3.2.3. Transient Heat Transfer 
 As with the plutonium model based analysis, time dependent must also be 
considered in the case of uranium. Matlab is used to create a computational model of the 
model. This computational approach is the same as in the plutonium analysis with slightly 
different geometry and materials. The maximum thermal stress as a result in the changes in 
temperature is also calculated and compared to the material tensile strength in order to 
determine if deformation or failure will occur. The same four scenarios are considered 
here. 
 In the first scenario, the uranium pit is inserted into the HNED. Prior to insertion, 
the HNED is at room temperature and the uranium pit is in thermal equilibrium with the 
surrounding room. Post insertion, the HNED is stationary within a large room and the heat 
is transferred at the surface of the HNED by way of natural convection and radiative heat 
transfer. 
 In the second scenario, the uranium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen prior 
to insertion. As in scenario 1, the HNED is at room temperature however the uranium pit is 
in thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen. Post insertion, the HNED is again 
stationary within a large room and the heat is transferred at the surface by way of natural 
convection and radiative heat transfer. 
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 In the third scenario, the uranium pit is inserted into an externally cooled HNED. 
Prior to insertion, the HNED is at thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen surrounding 
it and the uranium pit is at thermal equilibrium with the surrounding room. Post insertion, 
the HNED remains externally cooled by liquid nitrogen. 
 In the fourth scenario, the fully assembled, liquid nitrogen cooled HNED is removed 
and placed into a large room. The initial temperature profile of scenario 4 is the final 
temperature profile of scenario 3. Once the HNED is removed, heat is transferred at its 
surface by way of natural convection and radiative heat transfer. 
3.3.3. Figure of Merit Analysis 
 In order to make a broader statement regarding the material attractiveness with the 
addition 232U in uranium materials, the FOM equations found in Equation 2.1 and Equation 
2.2 are applied. Considering the FOM equations only apply to direct use nuclear materials, 
only the weapons grade uranium vector containing 232U can be used. Since two components 
of the FOM equations (dose rate and heat generation) increase over time, the FOM values 
for the uranium vector will be calculated at 0 year, 0.5 year, and 10 years. This will 
illustrate how the material attractiveness changes over time and if/when the uranium 
materials will become unattractive for weapons purposes. 
 The methods used to calculate each of the four components of the FOM equation; 
bare critical mass, dose rate, heat generation, and spontaneous fission neutron generation 
rate, are as follows. The bare critical mass will be found using kcode within MCNP. The 
geometry is a bare sphere of metallic uranium surrounded by air. The mass will be slightly 
modified until the mass is critical (keff=1). The heat generation is found by combining the 
uranium vectors with the decay heat per unit mass of each uranium isotope. Similarly, the 
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heat generation is found by combining the uranium vectors with the spontaneous fission 
neutron generation rate per unit mass of each uranium isotope. MCNP will be used to find 
the dose rate of 0.2 the bare critical mass from 1 meter. Using the gamma ray spectrum 
from RadSrc for each uranium vector, MCNP will calculate the dose rate 1 meter from the 
surface of a metallic uranium sphere having 0.2 the bare critical mass. 
 As in the case of the plutonium analysis, the sources of uncertainties must be 
accounted for. For the bare critical mass, multiple cross section libraries within MCNP6 are 
used to calculate multiple bare critical mass values. The spontaneous fission rate is 
calculated using the values in the book “Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials” 
(23) and using the software Sources 4C (50). These values are averaged and the standard 
deviation is used as the uncertainty. Considering the decay heat includes 232U daughter 
products, there is no easily assessable data to compare and include in the uncertainty. As 
with the plutonium analysis, the uncertainty from the dose rate is negligible. These values 
are averaged and the standard deviation is used as the uncertainty. 
3.3.4. Enrichment Issues 
 The relatively large alpha emission of 232U within gaseous UF6 could cause major 
enrichment issues. Calculating the number of UF6 molecules destroyed per time will gives 
insight into the magnitude of these issues. Approximately 9 UF6 molecules are destroyed 
per every keV deposited. Combining this with the average alpha particle energy released by 
232U (5301.6 keV) (21) and the activity of 232U in Becquerel will yield the rate of destruction 
of UF6 molecules. Equation 3.17 shows the relationship between the number of UF6 
molecules destroyed per second (U) and the activity of the 232U (A) and the average energy 
of the alpha particle emitted by 232U (E) (51). 
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Equation 3.17 
𝑈𝑈 = 9𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 
 Equation 3.17 will be applied to the uranium vectors shown in Table 3.6. This will 
show the effect of 232U’s alpha decay at various stages of the enrichment process. 
3.3.5. Effects on Safety 
 Although the dose rate from 232U is considered a proliferation resistant feature, 
elevated dose rate in materials used in a civilian nuclear fuel cycle pose operational 
challenges. Higher dose rates lead to higher and more expensive precautions to protect 
workers. In order to utilize 232U in a fuel cycle for nonproliferation considerations, the 
safety aspects of such use must be considered. 
 Three basic models found in a nuclear fuel cycle will be used: a UO2 fuel pellet, a UO2 
fuel rod, and a can of powdered UO2. These models will contain the uranium vectors shown 
in Table 3.6 (excluding the weapons grade vector). The dose rate from each model with 
each vector at 1 m will be calculated using MCNP. As mentioned previously, the gamma ray 
emissions will change over time and will be considered at time intervals of 0 year, 0.5 year, 
and 10 years. These dose rates will then be compared to set standards. 
 For completeness, the dose rate from neutron emissions will also be included. Both 
spontaneous fission neutrons and (α,n) neutrons must be included. In the case of the 
spontaneous fission neutron emissions, the source definition parameter is set to SF 
(spontaneous fission) and MCNP will calculate the dose rate from 1 meter from 
spontaneous fission neutrons. Since the (α,n) neutron energy spectrum is unique to the 
specific isotopic and elemental composition of the material, the spectrum must first be 
generated and input into MCNP. Sources 4C is utilized to calculate the (α,n) neutron 
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spectrum. Sources 4C is a program that takes the elemental and actinide composition of the 
material and outputs the (α,n) energy spectrum and yield (50). 
 The fuel pellet model consists of solid UO2 with a density of 10.96 g/cm3 (30) 
surrounded by dry air. The model has a height of 1 cm and a diameter of 1 cm (52). Figure 
3.1 shows the MCNP UO2 fuel pellet geometry. The red is the UO2. The yellow is dry air. 
 
Figure 3.1: UO2 Fuel Pellet Model 
 The fuel rod model consists of 400 fuel pellets stacked on one another surrounded 
by zirconium alloy cladding. The fuel pellets are identical to the one shown in Figure 3.1 
with a density of 10.96 g/cm3 and a radius and height of 1 cm. The total length of the fuel 
rod is 400 cm. The rod is surrounded by zirconium alloy cladding with a thickness of 0.06 
cm (53) and a density of 6.5 g/cm3 (30). Figure 3.2 shows a cross-sectional view of the 
MCNP UO2 fuel rod geometry. The red is the UO2. The yellow is dry air. The blue is the 
cladding. 
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Figure 3.2: UO2 Fuel Rod Model 
 The can of powdered UO2 consists of UO2 with a density of 2.5 g/cm3. The outer 
radius and height are 5.23 cm. The steel can is 0.39 cm thick and has a density of 7.8 g/cm3. 
These dimensions were chosen as they allow the can to contain approximately 990 g of 
uranium and is consistent with UISO standards (54). Figure 3.3 shows the MCNP UO2 can 
geometry. The red is the UO2. The yellow is dry air. The orange is the can. 
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Figure 3.3: UO2 Can Model 
3.3.6. Effects on Security 
 The introduction of 232U in uranium material will increase the detectability of the 
material and thus benefits security measures. Considering the energetic gamma rays of 232U 
daughter products and the relatively high spontaneous fission neutron emission rate of 
232U, the presence of 232U will increase the ability to detect the material by way of both 
gamma ray and neutron detectors. 
 The model used in the security analysis is a sphere of metallic uranium with a 5.39 
cm radius. The security model has a density of 19.05 g/cm3 and total uranium mass of 12.5 
kg. This mas was chosen as it is similar to ½ of a significant quantity (12.5 kg) (11).  The 
analysis will include the model unshielded and surrounded by 1 cm of lead shielding with a 
density of 11.3 g/cm3. The model will be analyzed first with the weapons grade (90%) 
vector with 232U. Then the analysis will be repeated for the weapons grade (90%) vector 
without 232U in order to illustrate the effect the introduction of 232U had on the overall 
detectability of the material. This model was chosen as the major focus of security to detect 
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covert smuggling of direct use materials. Figure 3.4 shows the shielded security model. The 
red is the metallic uranium. The green is the lead. The yellow is dry air. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Security Model 
 The gamma detector chosen for this analysis is a NaI-Tl detector. This detector 
consists of a solid 4”x4”x16” block of NaI-Tl with a density of 2.7 g/cm3 incased in a 0.04” 
shell of aluminum. It was chosen because its high-efficiency is more important for security 
purposes than energy resolution. Figure 3.5 shows the gamma detector used here. 
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Figure 3.5: 4x4x16 NaI-Tl Detector 
The gamma detector is 10 meters from the surface of the model and oriented such 
that the 4”x16” side faced the model. This configuration is simulated in MCNP6 using 
gamma ray spectra from RadSrc. The final spectrum will include a background spectrum 
taken by this detector within a concrete building at Virginia Commonwealth University in 
Richmond, Virginia. The measurement time for the spectra are 5 minutes. 
The neutron detector utilized here has four 3He tubes surrounded by high density 
polyethylene (HDPE). This detector will count the number of neutrons, rather than create 
an energy spectrum. Each 3He tube has a height of 32” and a radius of 1” at a pressure of 4 
atm. The outer dimensions of the HDPE are 7.22”x7.15”x47.5”. The detector is 10 meters 
from the model and oriented such that the sides of the 3He tubes face the model. Figure 3.6 
shows the neutron security detector model in MCNP6. The purple is the 3He. The green is 
the HDPE. The yellow is dry air. 
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Figure 3.6: Neutron Security Detector 
 As with the gamma ray measurements, the model shown in Figure 3.4 will first be 
measured for 5 minutes with the weapons grade (90%) vector with 232U. The results will 
then be compared to the results from the same 5-minute measurement interval with the 
weapons grade (90%) vector without 232U. The total number of neutrons from each 
measurement plus the estimated background counts are compared to quantify the increase 
in neutron detectability from the introduction of 232U. 
3.3.7. Effects on Safeguards 
 In order to implement uranium materials containing 232U into civilian nuclear fuel 
cycles, the effects on safeguards measurements must be explored. Basic nondestructive 
assay safeguards techniques of both gamma rays and neutrons are used to determine their 
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effectiveness on uranium materials containing 232U. The can model in Figure 3.3 is used for 
this analysis.  
 The gamma ray technique used here is a method to calculate the enrichment of 235U 
in the sample. This method compared the ratio of the intensity of the 185.7 keV 235U peak 
to the 1001 keV 234mPa. The 234mPa peak can be used in place of a 238U peak because 238U is 
in secular equilibrium with 234mPa at the time intervals considered in this study (0.5 year 
and 10 years). Equation 3.10 shows the ratio of the peak areas of the 235U and 238U without 
232U to the ratio of the peak areas of the 235U and 238U with 232U (23). This technique is 
applied to each of the pairs of uranium vectors shown in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 excluding 
the 90% vectors. 
Equation 3.18 
1 =
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 𝑈𝑈−232235
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 𝑈𝑈−232238
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑈𝑈−232235
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑈𝑈−232238
 
 The intensity of each of the peaks is found via the three-window extraction 
technique. The three-window extraction technique calculates the net peak area by 
calculating and subtracting the continuum from the peak (55). The continuum is calculated 
by forming two windows on both sides of the peak. Equation 3.19 shows the continuum 
counts (B) as a function of the number of bins in the peak’s region (N), the number of 
counts in the region to the left (B1), the number of bins in the region to the left (n1), the 
number of counts in the region to the right (B2), and the number of bins in the region to the 
right (n2). 
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Equation 3.19 
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑁𝑁
1
2
�
𝐵𝐵1
𝑛𝑛1
+
𝐵𝐵2
𝑛𝑛2
� 
 As shown in Equation 3.20, the continuum counts calculated in Equation 3.19 (B) is 
subtracted from the gross counts in the peak region (P), yielding the net peak area (S). 
Equation 3.20 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝐵𝐵 
 A 2”x2” HPGe detector is chosen for the safeguards measurements, because of its 
high energy resolution which allows for easy identification and analysis of the 235U and 238U 
peaks. MCNP6 is used to generate a gamma ray spectrum and the measurements are 5 
minutes. 
 The neutron techniques chosen here are active and passive neutron 
coincidence/multiplicity counting. Both techniques seek to quantify the mass of uranium in 
the sample. An active measurement refers to a measurement in which the sample is being 
irradiated by a source during the measurement, in this case with neutrons. A passive 
measurement refers to a measurement in which the sample is being measured without an 
external source of radiation. Typically, neutron measurements on uranium materials are 
active because the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of naturally occurring 
uranium isotopes are relatively low. However, passive measurements of uranium materials 
have been shown effective in calculating the 238Ueff mass (56). 
 A brief review neutron multiplicity basics is useful in understanding the analyses 
used here. Considering neutrons are released in multiples from fission events, the detection 
of these multiples can be related to the mass of material being measured. The detection of a 
single neutron is known as a singles count (S). The detection of two neutrons closely 
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correlated in time is known as a doubles count (D). The detection of three neutrons closely 
correlated in time is known as a triples count (T). 
Passive neutron measurements can be used to calculate an “effective” mass, 
typically of the isotope with a notable contribution to the neutron generation rate. In this 
analysis, the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) and 232U mass (m232 eff) are used. Equation 3.21 
shows the relationship between the k value for the 23xU isotope (k23x238) and the 
spontaneous fission rate per unit mass of the 23xU isotope (F0_23x), the second spontaneous 
fission factorial moment of the 23xU isotope (νs2_23x), the spontaneous fission rate per unit 
mass of 238U (F0_238), and the second spontaneous fission factorial moment of 238U (νs2_238). 
Equation 3.21 
𝑘𝑘23𝑥𝑥238 =
𝐹𝐹0_23𝑥𝑥𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_23𝑥𝑥
𝐹𝐹0_238𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_238
 
Equation 3.22 shows the relationship between the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) and 
the k values of each uranium isotope and the mass of each uranium isotope. 
Equation 3.22 
𝑚𝑚238 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑘𝑘232238𝑚𝑚232 + 𝑘𝑘234238𝑚𝑚234 + 𝑘𝑘235238𝑚𝑚235 + 𝑚𝑚238 
Equation 3.23 shows the relationship between the k value for the 23xU isotope 
(k23x232) and the spontaneous fission rate per unit mass of the 23xU isotope (F0_23x), the 
second spontaneous fission factorial moment of the 23xU isotope (νs2_23x), the spontaneous 
fission rate per unit mass of 232U (F0_232), and the second spontaneous fission factorial 
moment of 232U (νs2_232). 
Equation 3.23 
𝑘𝑘23𝑥𝑥232 =
𝐹𝐹0_23𝑥𝑥𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_23𝑥𝑥
𝐹𝐹0_232𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_232
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Equation 3.24 shows the relationship between the effective 232U mass (m232 eff) and 
the k values of each uranium isotope and the mass of each uranium isotope. The k23223x is 
the ratio of the spontaneous fission rate per mass of 23xU to the spontaneous fission rate 
per mass of 232U.  
 
Equation 3.24 
𝑚𝑚232 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑚𝑚232 + 𝑘𝑘234232𝑚𝑚234 + 𝑘𝑘235232𝑚𝑚235 + 𝑘𝑘238232𝑚𝑚238 
 Equation 3.25 shows the relationship between the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) with 
the singles counts (S), doubles counts (D), detector efficiency (ε), doubles gate fraction (fd), 
leakage multiplication factor (ML), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi1), 
the second factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi2), the first factorial spontaneous 
fission multiplicity of 238U (νs2), and the spontaneous fission yield of 238U (F0) (56). 
Equation 3.25 
𝑚𝑚238 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =
2𝐷𝐷
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑
− 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − 1)𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2𝑀𝑀𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1
𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2
 
 Equation 3.26 shows the relationship between the effective 232U mass (m232 eff) with 
the singles counts (S), doubles counts (D), detector efficiency (ε), doubles gate fraction (fd), 
leakage multiplication factor (ML), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi1), 
the second factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi2), the first factorial spontaneous 
fission multiplicity of 232U (νs2), and the spontaneous fission yield of 232U (F0). 
Equation 3.26 
𝑚𝑚232 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =
2𝐷𝐷
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑
− 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − 1)𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2𝑀𝑀𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1
𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹0𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2
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 Equation 3.27 shows the relationship between the doubles gate fraction (fd) as a 
function of the pre-delay gate width (P), the gate width (G), and the neutron die-away time 
(τ). 
Equation 3.27 
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 = 𝑒𝑒
−𝑃𝑃𝜏𝜏(1 − 𝑒𝑒−
𝐺𝐺
𝜏𝜏) 
 The leakage multiplications (ML) is calculated using three coefficients (a, b, c). 
Considering the coefficients contain values specific to the uranium isotope whose effective 
mass is being calculated, it must be calculated for both the 238U and 232U effective masses. 
Equation 3.28 shows the relationship between the leakage multiplication (ML) and the 
coefficients (a, b, c). 
Equation 3.28 
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 + 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2 + 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿3 = 0 
 Equation 3.29 shows the relationship between a and the singles counts (S), the 
triples counts (T), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi1), the second factorial 
induced fission multiplicity (νi2), the third factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi3), the 
second factorial spontaneous fission multiplicity (νs2), the third factorial spontaneous 
fission multiplicity (νs3), the efficiency of the detector (ε), and the triples gate fraction (ft). 
Equation 3.29 
𝑎𝑎 = −
6𝜕𝜕𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2(𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1)
𝜀𝜀2𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀(𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2) 
 
 Equation 3.30 shows the relationship between b and the singles counts (S), the 
doubles counts (D), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi1), the second factorial 
induced fission multiplicity (νi2), the third factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi13), the 
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second factorial spontaneous fission multiplicity (νs2), the third factorial spontaneous 
fission multiplicity (νs3), the efficiency of the detector (ε), and the doubles gate fraction (fd). 
Equation 3.30 
𝑏𝑏 =
2𝐷𝐷[𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3(𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1) − 3𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2]
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀(𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2)
 
 Equation 3.31 shows the relationship between c and the singles counts (S), the 
doubles counts (D), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi1), the second factorial 
induced fission multiplicity (νi2), the third factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi13), the 
second factorial spontaneous fission multiplicity (νs2), the third factorial spontaneous 
fission multiplicity (νs3), the efficiency of the detector (ε), and the doubles gate fraction (fd). 
Equation 3.31 
𝑐𝑐 =
6𝐷𝐷𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀(𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2)
− 1 
 Table 3.9 shows the induced fission multiplicities of 235U and the spontaneous 
fission multiplicities of 238U. These values for 232U will be obtained using MCNP6. 
Table 3.9: Induced and Spontaneous Fission Multiplicities 
 νi1 νi2 νi3 νs1 νs2 νs3 
235U 2.69 6.17 11.57 - - - 
238U - - - 1.99 2.87 2.82 
232U - - - 1.71 2.34 2.33 
 
 The neutron die away time is related to the detector configuration and is often cited 
from a known value. However, an MCNP output can also be used to calculate it. The doubles 
counts from two gate widths (one is the standard gate width for that detector (G) and the 
other is half the standard gate width) are used to calculate the neutron die away time. 
Equation 3.32 shows the relationship between the neutron die away time (τ) to the shorter 
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gate width (G1), the normalized doubles counts from the shorter gate (D1), and the 
normalized doubles counts from the longer gate (D2). 
Equation 3.32 
𝜏𝜏 =
𝐺𝐺1
ln �𝐷𝐷2𝐷𝐷1
− 1�
 
 
Similarly, the efficiency can also be calculated via MCNP. Equation 3.33 shows the 
relationship between the efficiency (ε) and the normalized singles counts (Snorm) and the 
net multiplication (Mnet). 
Equation 3.33 
𝜀𝜀 =
𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤
 
 The passive technique described here will first be used to calculate the effective 238U 
mass and then the effective 232U mass. These masses will be compared to the known value. 
The can model with the uranium vectors that do not include 232U are simulated to calculate 
an effective 238U mass in each case. This will be repeated with the uranium vectors 
including 232U and both the 238U and 232U effective masses will be used. 
 Active neutron coincidence counting is a bit more simplistic. The doubles counts 
from the same detector and sample configuration have a linear relationship to the 235U 
mass, for small multiplication values (56). Multiple samples having the same geometry and 
mass but various 235U concentrations can be measured and related to the 235U mass. 
Repeating this procedure for each of the uranium vectors containing 232U in the can model 
will illustrate the methods effectiveness at verifying 235U mass despite the presence of 232U. 
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 The major source of uncertainty are the singles, doubles, and triples counts. The 
computational uncertainties from the MCNP6 simulations are not related to the 
uncertainties expected in a real world measurement. In order to estimate the uncertainties 
of a real world measurement, a technique developed by Dr. Croft will be used (57). 
Equation 3.34 shows the relationship between the singles count rate uncertainty (σs) and 
the singles count rate (Sr), the measurement time (t), the doubles count rate (Dr), and the 
doubles gate fraction (fd). 
Equation 3.34 
𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆 = �
𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝜕
+
2𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
 
 Equation 3.35 shows the relationship between the doubles count rate uncertainty 
(σD) and the gate width (G), the doubles gate fraction (fd), the neutron die away time (τ), 
the singles count rate (Sr), the doubles count rate (Dr), and the measurement time (t). 
Equation 3.35 
𝜀𝜀𝐷𝐷 = �(1 + 8(1 −
1 − 𝑒𝑒−
𝐺𝐺
𝜏𝜏
𝐺𝐺
𝜏𝜏
)(
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠
𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑
) )
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 + 2𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠2𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕
 
 Equation 3.36 shows the relationship between the triples count rate (σT), which is 
Equation 3.36 
𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇
=
⎷
⃓⃓
⃓⃓
⃓⃓
⃓⃓
�⃓
�1 + 10�1 −
1 − 𝑒𝑒−
𝐺𝐺
𝜏𝜏
𝐺𝐺
𝜏𝜏
��
𝐷𝐷
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀
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 The Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) is used for both the passive and active 
simulations. Although the AWCC has primarily an active configuration, the neutron sources 
can be removed making it a passive configuration. The AWCC has 42 3He tubes embedded 
in HDPE. The sample cavity is 20 cm in diameter and can be adjusted from 23 to 35 cm in 
height. In its active configuration, the AWCC has two AmLi neutron sources (58). The AWCC 
can be operated in two modes; thermal or fast mode. In fast mode, a cadmium sleeve is 
used to remove thermal neutrons thus preventing them from scattering back into the 
sample and inducing fission. The cadmium sleeve is removed in thermal mode (59). The 
MCNP6 model of the AWCC used for this analysis is in fast mode. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1. Plutonium Analysis 
4.1.1. Model Based Analysis 
 This section contains both the steady state and transient temperature profiles of the 
various models described earlier. The plutonium vector shown in Table 3.1 is utilized in the 
weapons pit of each model with the exception of the Kessler comparison. 
 Figure 4.1 shows the steady state temperature profile of Kessler’s high technology 
model from Figure 2.1 with the plutonium vector shown in Table 3.2. The temperature 
within the high explosives does surpass the self-explosion temperature. This self-explosion 
would render the HNED useless. Kessler’s plutonium vector has less than half the 238Pu 
concentration as the plutonium vector from the Lightbridge fuel simulation. However, the 
temperature barely reaches the self-explosion temperature and as previously discussed, 
Kessler’s model does not represent a limiting case. Therefore, the 238Pu concentration in 
Kessler’s plutonium vector would not be enough to reach the self-explosion temperature in 
the high explosive of a more limiting case HNED. 
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Figure 4.1: Steady State Temperature Profile of Kessler's Model (60) 
 The decay heat contribution from the plutonium vector in Table 4.1 in each layer of 
Model One is shown Table 4.1. All decay heat contributions besides α and β decay within 
the plutonium pit are negligible. Thus only the heat generation from α and β decay within 
the plutonium pit will be included. 
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Table 4.1: Decay Heat Contribution within Model One [W] (60) 
Material α/β decay γ 
spontaneous fission 
total 
γ n fission fragments 
induced 
fission total 
Pu 8.71·102 2.80·10-1 9.68·10-4 9.09·10-4 2.47·10-3 9.68·10-4 5.31·10-3 8.70·102 
Unat 1.71·10-3 6.10·10-5 2.41·10-4 2.28·10-4 2.47·10-3 2.41·10-4 3.18·10-3 4.95·10-3 
Al - 1.17·10-10 5.94·10-6 2.81·10-6 - - 8.75·10-6 8.75·10-6 
PBX 9502 - 1.37·10-11 3.07·10-5 1.06·10-5 - - 4.13·10-5 4.13·10-5 
Steel 
casing 
 0.00·100 2.94·10-7 3.53·10-10 - - 2.95·10-7 2.95·10-7 
 
 Figure 4.2 shows the steady state temperature profile of Model One. The 
temperature within the high explosives reaches the self-explosion temperature, rendering 
the HNED useless. 
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Figure 4.2: Model One Steady State Temperature Profile (60) 
 Table 4.2 shows each decay heat contribution within each layer of Model Two. As in 
Model One, only α and β decay within the plutonium is notable and all other decay heat 
contributions are considered negligible. 
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Table 4.2: Decay Heat Contributions within Model Two [W] (60) 
Material α/β  decay γ 
spontaneous fission 
total γ n fission fragments 
induced 
fission total 
Pu 4.93·102 1.58·10-1 2.14·10-6 3.23·10-5 1.41·10-3 3.44·10-5 1.48·10-3 4.94·102 
Be - 1.91·10-5 9.21·10-8 2.67·10-7 - - 3.59·10-7 1.94·10-5 
Udep 5.29·10-4 3.35·10-5 1.57·10-6 6.01·10-6 9.06·10-9 6.39·10-6 1.40·10-5 5.77·10-4 
PBX 
9502 - 1.15·10
-8 1.12·10-7 5.11·10-7 - - 6.23·10-7 6.34·10-7 
Al casing - 1.04·10-9 1.25·10-8 3.77·10-9 - - 1.63·10-8 1.73·10-8 
 
 Figure 4.3 shows the steady state temperature profile within Model Two. The 
temperature within the high explosives surpasses the self-explosion temperature by nearly 
100 °C. Like Model One, Model Two would be rendered useless. 
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Figure 4.3: Model Two Steady State Temperature Profile (60) 
 The following discussion focusses on the transient heat transfer within Model Two 
as a result of four different scenarios. Below is a brief review of each scenario. 
• Scenario 1: the plutonium pit reaches thermal equilibrium with surrounding room 
then inserted into Model Two 
• Scenario 2: the plutonium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen then inserted 
into Model Two 
• Scenario 3: the plutonium pit is inserted into an externally cooled Model Two 
• Scenario 4: the fully assembled Model Two in thermal equilibrium with liquid 
nitrogen is removed and placed into a large room 
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 Figure 4.4 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals of 
Model Two from scenario 1. The temperature within the high explosives reaches the self-
explosion temperature within 7.5 hours. In order to avoid premature detonation of Model 
Two, the HNED must be detonated less than 7.5 hours from the insertion of the plutonium 
pit. This time frame is relatively small and not useful for deterrence purposes. An HNED 
utilized for deterrence must be armed and ready quickly for an extended period of time 
(months to years). 
 
Figure 4.4: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 1 (42) 
 Figure 4.5 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals of 
Model Two from scenario 2. As in scenario 1, the temperature within the high explosives 
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reaches the self-explosion temperature within 7.5 hours. As discussed above, this time 
frame is too short for deterrence purposes and would be significantly inconvenient. 
 
Figure 4.5: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 2 (42) 
  Figure 4.6 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals 
of Model Two from scenario 3. The external cooling keeps the temperature well 
below the high explosive temperature. Model Two could be stored externally cooled 
by liquid nitrogen for an indefinite amount of time. Although this would be useful 
for deterrence purposes, the costs of externally cooling Model Two for an extended 
period of time would be expensive and would likely cause other challenges that 
would need to be overcome. 
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Figure 4.6: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 3 (42) 
 Figure 4.7 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals of 
Model Two from scenario 4. Unlike in scenarios 1 and 2, the temperature reaches the self-
explosion temperature within the high explosives in slightly longer than 7.5 hours. This 
scenario would also be impractical from a deterrence perspective. The results from 
scenarios 1, 2, and 4 show that regardless of how the pit or HNED is cooled, natural 
convective and radiative heat transfer within an empty room causes the temperature 
within the high explosives to reach the self-explosion temperature too quickly for the 
HNED to be useful for deterrence. 
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Figure 4.7: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 4 (42) 
 Figure 4.8 through Figure 4.12 show the maximum thermal stress as a function of 
time within each layer of Model Two during each scenario and the tensile strength of that 
material. In the aluminum and plutonium layers, the maximum stress does not reach the 
tensile strength in any of the four scenarios. Thus, no plastic deformation will occur in the 
aluminum or plutonium layers as a result of thermal stress. In the uranium layer, the 
maximal thermal stress reaches the tensile strength in scenarios 1, 2, and 4 within 
approximately 200-300 minutes. Plastic deformation will occur within the uranium in 200-
300 minutes in scenarios 1, 2, and 4, but no plastic deformation will occur in scenario 3. In 
the high explosives and beryllium layers, the maximum thermal stress reaches the tensile 
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strength in all 4 scenarios within 300 minutes. Plastic deformation will occur in the high 
explosives and beryllium in all 4 scenarios. This deformation can decrease the overall 
performance of Model Two by producing asymmetry within the layers. This asymmetry 
will cause asymmetry within the implosion reducing the yield. Although Model Two would 
likely somewhat function, the reduction of the yield may not be considered effective 
depending on the adversary. In the case of a state entity, the use of a nuclear weapon that 
underperforms could have dire consequences if used, because the other nuclear weapons 
states will have weapons that almost certainly won’t underperform. However, in the case of 
a non-state entity, the use of a nuclear weapon with any notable yield may be considered 
effective. 
 
Figure 4.8: Maximum Thermal Stress within the Aluminum 
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Figure 4.9: Maximum Thermal Stress within the High Explosives 
 
Figure 4.10: Maximum Thermal Stress within the Uranium 
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Figure 4.11: Maximum Thermal Stress within the Beryllium 
 
Figure 4.12: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Plutonium 
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4.1.2. Figure of Merit Analysis 
 In order to calculate the FOM1 and FOM2 values, each of the components must first 
be calculated. Table 4.3 shows the FOM components: bare critical mass (M), heat decay (h), 
spontaneous fission neutron generation rate (S), and the dose rate (D), for the plutonium 
vectors from the Lightbridge fuel inspired design (LB), the light water reactor used fuel 
(LWR), and the mixed oxide used fuel (MOX). The uncertainty in the bare critical mass was 
found by repeating the k-code simulations using three different data libraries in MCNP6: 
.60c, .65c, and .80c. Although the bare critical mass of the Lightbridge vector is slightly 
lower than the LWR and MOX, the heat decay and spontaneous fission neutron generation 
rate are notably higher. As expected, the dose rate is relatively low. 
Table 4.3: FOM Components 
 LB LWR MOX 
M [kg] 22.6 ± 0.5 24.2 ± 0.2 24.0 ± 0.3 
h [W/kg] 104.6 ± 1.3 14.6 ± 0.2 24.1 ± 0.3 
S [n/s·kg]·105 8.91 ± 0.11 5.06 ± 0.01 5.94 ± 0.01 
D [rem/h] 0.0751 ± 0.0015 0.0088 ± 0.0001 0.0138 ± 0.0001 
 
 Table 4.4 shows the FOM values for the three plutonium vectors. As a review, FOM1 
applies to less technically advanced states and FOM2 applies to technically advanced states. 
In the case of less technically advanced states, all three plutonium vectors are unattractive 
for weapons purposes. In the case of the technically advanced states, all three plutonium 
vectors are attractive. When comparing the LB plutonium vector to the other two (LWR 
and MOX), both FOM1 and FOM2 are notably lower. However, considering they still fall 
within the same range, the significance of the difference between the values is debatable 
and can’t give any real conclusion as to which vector is more or less attractive. 
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Table 4.4: FOM Values 
 LB LWR MOX 
FOM1 0.457 ± 0.010 0.720 ± 0.005 0.647 ± 0.005 
FOM2 1.260 ± 0.023 1.964 ± 0.002 1.801 ± 0.002 
 
4.2. Uranium Analysis 
4.2.1. Model Based Analysis 
 This section analyzes the steady state and transient heat transfer within the updated 
model described in Table 3.8. The weapons grade (90%) uranium vector from Table 3.6 is 
used. Considering Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show that all other sources of heat are negligible, 
only the heat generation from the α decay within the uranium weapons pit will be included.  
In addition to the heat transfer, the dose rate to the high explosives will also be calculated. 
 Figure 4.13 shows the total heat generation in units of Watts over time. As the 232U 
decays, its daughter products contribute additional decay heat which greatly increases the 
total heat generation. This value reaches a maximum after approximately 10 years. 
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Figure 4.13: Heat Generation of Weapons Pit over Time 
 Although the decay heat increases over time, the rate of increase is on the order of 
months. As shown in the transient plutonium analysis, steady state is reached after 
approximately a day, so we shall assume steady state is reached at each of the time 
intervals of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 5, and 10 years.  
 Figure 4.14 through Figure 4.20 show the steady state temperature profiles at the 
various time intervals. Even when the uranium is fresh (t=0), the temperature within the 
high explosives reaches its “self-explosion” temperature. Over time, the temperature within 
the model increase significantly to the point of exceeding the “self-explosion” temperature 
within the high explosives by 100’s of degrees. These results show the heat generation 
produced is well above what is required to render the HNED useless. 
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Figure 4.14: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 0 
0
100
200
300
400
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 [°
C]
Radius [cm]
5.9 7.0 9.0 12.0 22.0
23.0
U Be Udep High explosives
Self-explosion
Temperature
Casing
79 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 0.25 year 
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Figure 4.16: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 0.5 year 
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Figure 4.17: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 1 year 
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Figure 4.18: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 2 years 
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Figure 4.19: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 5 years 
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Figure 4.20: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 10 years 
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 In addition to the effects of the heat generation on the high explosives, the dose rate 
from the decay of 232U also damages the high explosives. Figure 4.21 shows the dose rate to 
the high explosives over time. 
 
Figure 4.21: Dose Rate to the High Explosives over time 
 In order to obtain the total dose to the high explosives, the dose rate over time must 
be integrated. Figure 4.22 shows the dose rate to the high explosives over time and the 100 
MR (8.77·107 rad) degradation limit. The degradation limit is reach after approximately 2.1 
years. Thus, the high explosives would begin to degrade 2.1 years after the full assembly of 
the weapon. The fully assembled weapon must not be stored for longer than 2.1 years 
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because the degradation of the high explosives would lead to a significant reduction of the 
performance of the implosion eventually leading to total ineffectiveness of the weapon. 
 
Figure 4.22: Dose to the High Explosives over time 
 The transient heat transfer analysis will include the 4 scenarios briefly described 
below. Only the fresh uranium vector (t = 0) will be analyzed, rather than include every 
time interval. 
• Scenario 1: the uranium pit reaches thermal equilibrium with surrounding room 
then inserted into the Model 
• Scenario 2: the uranium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen then inserted into 
the Model 
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• Scenario 3: the uranium pit is inserted into an externally cooled Model 
• Scenario 4: the fully assembled Model in thermal equilibrium with liquid nitrogen is 
removed and placed into a large room 
 Figure 4.23 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 1. The 
temperature within the high explosives reaches its self-explosion temperature after 
approximately one day. This is a relatively small time frame and would require the weapon 
be used the same day of the insertion of the weapons pit. For deterrence purposes, the time 
frame is too short and storing the weapons pit separately would likely be impractical and 
reduces the level of readiness. 
 
Figure 4.23: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 1 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 {°
C]
Radium [cm]
t = 0
t = 1 min.
t = 1 hr.
t = 6 hr.
t = 12 hr.
t = 1 d.
Steady State
Self-Explosion
Temperature
U Be Udep High explosives Casing
5.9 7.0 9.0 12.0 22.0
23.0
88 
 
 Figure 4.24 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 2. As in scenario 
1, the temperature within the high explosives reaches its self-explosion temperature after 
approximately one day. The lower initial temperature profile of the weapons pit only 
reduces the time taken to reach the self-explosion temperature by minutes. The final 
conclusion is the same as in scenario 1. 
 
Figure 4.24: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 2 
 Figure 4.25 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 3. The external 
cooling of the liquid nitrogen prevents the temperature within the high explosives from 
reaching its self-explosive temperature. Although this technique is effective, continually 
cooling the HNED with liquid nitrogen would be expensive and impractical. 
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Figure 4.25: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 3 
 Figure 4.26 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 4. As in scenario 
1 and 2, the temperature within the high explosives reaches its self-explosion temperature 
after approximately one day. Although Figure 4.25 shows that continually cooling the 
HNED with liquid nitrogen will prevent self-explosion, once removed from the liquid 
nitrogen, the HNED must be used within one day in order to avoid self-explosion. 
Considering how expensive and complicated liquid nitrogen storage would be and the 
limited time frame, scenario 4 would be impractical. 
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Figure 4.26: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 4 
 Figure 4.27 through Figure 4.31 shows the maximum thermal stress over time and 
tensile strength of each material in the HNED model. The thermal stress in the aluminum 
and weapons grade uranium do not reach their tensile strength in any of the scenarios, 
thus no plastic deformation will occur. The thermal stress in the high explosives and 
depleted uranium reach their tensile strength within approximately an hour in scenarios 1, 
2, and 3. Plastic deformation will occur in these materials causing asymmetries in the 
implosion and reducing the yield. The maximum thermal stress in the beryllium reaches its 
tensile strength in all four scenarios. In scenarios 1, 2, and 3, the tensile strength is reached 
within an hour. In scenario 4, the tensile strength is reached within a day. In all four 
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scenarios, plastic deformation will occur in at least one shell of the HNED. This plastic 
deformation will reduce the yield of the HNED. The underperformance of a nuclear weapon 
may discourage its use by a state entity. 
 
Figure 4.27: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Aluminum 
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Figure 4.28: Maximum Thermal Stress in the High Explosives 
 
Figure 4.29: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Depleted Uranium 
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Figure 4.30: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Beryllium 
 
Figure 4.31: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Weapons Grade Uranium 
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4.2.2. Figure of Merit Analysis 
 In order to calculate the Figure of Merit values for the “90%” uranium isotopic 
vector including 232U, each factor must be calculated. The bare critical mass is 39.0 ± 1.6 kg. 
The spontaneous fission neutron generation rate is 81.7 ± 1.5 neutrons/s·kg. This value is 
too low to produce a significant difference between the FOM1 and FOM2 equations, therefor 
spontaneous fission neutron generation rate will be excluded from the calculation of the 
Figure of Merit and the results are assumed to be applicable to both less technically 
advanced and technically advanced states. Figure 4.32 shows the heat generation per mass 
of the uranium material over time. As shown, the heat generation increases by more than a 
factor of five over the ten year time interval. Due to limits in the available nuclear data, the 
uncertainty of the heat generation is not included. 
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Figure 4.32: Heat Generation per Mass vs. Time 
 Figure 4.33 shows the dose rate from 1 meter of 0.2 times the bare critical mass 
over time. The dose rate initially increases from approximately zero rem/h to nearly 1000 
rem/h over the ten year time interval. The “self-protection” dose rate of 500 rem/h is 
reached after approximately 1.5 years. 
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Figure 4.33: Dose Rate from 1 meter of 2/10 the Bare Critical Mass vs. Time 
 Figure 4.34 shows the Figure of Merit values over time. The increase in dose rate 
and heat generation cause a significant decrease in the Figure of Merit value and therefor 
the material attractiveness over time. After approximately 6 to 9 months, the uranium 
material becomes unattractive for weapons purposes to both less technically advanced 
states and technically advanced states. After 10 years, the Figure of Merit value is nearly 
below one and thus the material is nearly very unattractive. This essential creates a time 
limit for the weapons utility of the material. Although the material is certainly usable for 
weapons purposes within the first 6 to 9 months, once the material becomes unattractive, 
the 232U daughter products must be removed in order to renew the material’s weapons 
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utility. The burden of semi-annually refurbishing the uranium material in order to maintain 
a level of readiness would be significant for any state. Considering the primary function of 
most nuclear weapons arsenals are for deterrence purposes, the level of readiness must be 
constantly maintained. Although the use of such a material for weapons purposes is not 
impossible, using this material for deterrence purposes is highly impractical. 
 
Figure 4.34: Figure of Merit Values vs. Time 
4.2.3. Enrichment Issues 
 Table 4.5 shows the percentage of UF6 molecules decomposed per second of each of 
the uranium isotopic vectors containing 232U. Although these values may appear small, the 
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Table 4.5: Percentage of UF6 Molecules Decomposed per second 
Initial 3% 5% 20% 90% 
3.33·10-7 2.04·10-6 3.54·10-6 1.48·10-5 6.91·10-5 
 
 Table 4.6 shows the total percentage of UF6 molecules decomposed over various 
time intervals from each uranium isotopic vectors containing 232U. These time intervals 
were chosen as they represent various amounts of time gaseous UF6 may be stored in a 
civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Even the percentages of UF6 decomposed after only one day 
would significantly alter the enrichment process. The production of fractions of a percent 
of molecules having notably lower masses into the enrichment stream would cause these 
molecules to significantly increase. This would be counterproductive to the primary goal of 
enrichment: increasing the concentration of 235U. 
Table 4.6: Percentage of UF6 Molecules Decomposed over Various Time Intervals 
Time interval Initial 3% 5% 20% 90% 
One day 0.03 0.18 0.31 1.28 5.97 
One week 0.20 1.23 2.14 8.93 41.81 
One month 0.87 5.34 9.27 38.70 181.18 
 
 This analysis is a preliminary simplification of the possible issues 232U may cause in 
the enrichment process. Although some of the percentages in Table 4.6 are not entirely 
realistic (such as the 181.18%), these values do indicate that if 232U at the concentrations 
found here were introduced into the enrichment process, significant UF6 decomposition 
would occur. This illustrates the magnitude of the impact 232U may have on enrichment. 
Before 232U could practically be implemented into a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, this impact 
would need to be more thoroughly explored and additional measures must be taken in 
order to effectively enrich the uranium materials containing 232U. 
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4.2.4. Effects on Safety 
 This section will discuss the dose rate from 1 meter from the gamma ray and 
neutron emissions of the pellet model shown in Figure 3.1, the rod model shown in Figure 
3.2, and the can model shown in Figure 3.3. The initial, 3%, 5%, and 20% uranium isotopic 
vectors with 232U from Table 3.6. Since the gamma ray emissions change drastically as the 
daughter products of 232U build-up, the dose rate from the gamma rays are considered at 
time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years. 
 Table 4.7 shows the dose rate in units of rem/h from 1 meter from the gamma 
emissions of the pellet models at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years. 
Table 4.7: Gamm Ray Dose Rate [rem/h] of Pellet Models from 1 meter 
Time [years] Initial 3% 5% 20% 
0 1.095·10-7 6.709·10-7 1.159·10-6 4.839·10-6 
0.5 0.001 0.006 0.010 0.040 
10 0.005 0.031 0.054 0.225 
 
 Table 4.8 shows the dose rate in units of rem/h from 1 meter of the rod models from 
the gamma emissions at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years. 
Table 4.8: Gamm Ray Dose Rate [rem/h] of the Rod Models from 1 meter 
Time [years] Initial 3% 5% 20% 
0 2.545·10-6 4.397·10-6 2.694·10-5 1.123·10-4 
0.5 0.038 0.207 0.405 1.695 
10 0.215 1.322 2.285 9.550 
 
 Table 4.9 shows the dose rates in units of rem/h from 1 meter of the can models 
from the gamma emissions at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years. 
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Table 4.9: Gamma Ray Dose Rate [rem/h] of Can Models from 1 meter 
Time [years] Initial 3% 5% 20% 
0 1.909·10-5 1.170·10-4 2.021·10-4 8.438·10-4 
0.5 0.402 2.464 4.258 17.798 
10 2.263 13.881 23.988 100.265 
 
 Considering the amount of uranium mass does not change significantly over the 10 
year time interval, the neutron emissions are assumed to be constant. Table 4.10 shows the 
dose rates from the neutron emissions (both spontaneous fission and (α,n)) of the pellet, 
rod, and can models. 
Table 4.10: Neutron Dose Rate of the Models from 1 meter 
Model Initial 3% 5% 20% 
Pellet 8.208·10-9 5.083·10-8 8.689·10-8 7.030·10-7 
Rod 3.863·10-7 2.229·10-6 4.091·10-6 1.718·10-5 
Can 4.634·10-6 2.840·10-5 4.909·10-5 2.066·10-4 
 
 In order to compare the dose rates to the 5 rem annual limit of the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the total amount of time an exposed worker would reach 
this total dose limit is calculated. 
 Table 4.11 shows the total number of hours a worker exposed to the pellet models 
would reach the NRC’s annual limit of 5 rem. 
Table 4.11: Total Time [hours] until Worker Exposed to the Pellet Models would reach 5 rem 
limit 
Time [years] Initial 3% 5% 20% 
0 26,102,530 6,927,959 4,012,805 902,211 
0.5 5,539 903 523 125 
10 983 160 93 22 
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 Table 4.12 shows the total number of hours a worker exposed to the rod models 
would reach the NRC’s annual limit of 5 rem. 
Table 4.12: Total Time [hours] until Worker Exposed to the Rod Models would reach 5 rem 
limit 
Time [years] Initial 3% 5% 20% 
0 1,705,908 754,593 161,097 38,562 
0.5 131 24 12 3 
10 23 4 2 1 
 
 Table 4.13 shows the total number of hours a worker exposed to the can models 
would reach the NRC’s annual limit of 5 rem. 
Table 4.13: Total Time [hours] until Worker Exposed to the Can Models would reach 5 rem 
limit 
Time [years] Initial 3% 5% 20% 
0 210,782 34,394 19,905 4,760 
0.5 12 2 1 0 
10 2 0 0 0 
 
 Assuming a 40-hour work week, the total number of hours in an entire work year is 
2,080 hours. Although this number does not include possible holidays, such an 
approximation is adequate for this discussion. In all three models, the dose rates initially 
could not possibly reach the annual limit. However, after only 0.5 year the 3%, 5%, 20% 
isotopic vector pellet models could reach the limit within a year. The rod and can models 
with every isotopic vector considered here pose a significant dose rate threat at both the 
0.5 and 10 year time intervals. In some cases, the 5 rem annual limit is reached within only 
a few hours or even within an hour. This illustrates a significant issue with implementing 
232U at the concentrations discussed here in a civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Additional 
shielding precautions would be essential to handling these materials and would be a 
102 
 
financial burden to any state seeking to utilize these materials. This must be considered 
before 232U can be utilized to reduce material attractiveness purposes. 
4.2.5. Effects on Security 
 This section will analyze gamma ray and neutron security measurements of the 
model shown in Figure 3.4 in both its non-shielded and shielded configurations. 
Measurements of the 90% vector with 232U from Table 3.6 and the 90% vector without 232U 
from Table 3.7 are compared. Since the scenarios considered here are the detection of a 
weapon’s usable uranium material, the initial, 3%, 5%, and 20% vectors are excluded. 
 The gamma ray spectra found via the MCNP6 simulations of the security model and 
the detector shown in Figure 3.5 at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years of the isotopic 
vectors with and without 232U are shown below. The measurement time is 5 minutes and 
the detector is 10 meters from the surface of the model. Figure 4.35 shows the spectra 
fresh non-shielded geometries. Figure 4.36 shows the spectra from 0.5 year non-shielded 
geometries. Figure 4.37 shows the spectra from 10 year non-shielded geometries. Even at 
the initial time interval of 0 years, low energy peaks in the gamma ray spectrum with 232U 
are clearly visible above the background spectrum. At the 0.5 and 10 year time intervals, 
the spectra with 232U is several order of magnitudes above both background and the 
spectra without 232U. The spectra with 232U is clearly visible and distinguishable between 
that without 232U. This illustrates a significant increase in the detectability of the 
weaponized uranium material via the introduction of 232U. 
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Figure 4.35: Fresh non-shielded geometry 
 
Figure 4.36: 0.5 year non-shielded geometry 
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Figure 4.37: 10 year non-shielded geometry 
 The results from the shielded geometries are similar to that of the non-shielded 
cases. Figure 4.38 shows the spectra from the fresh shielded geometries. Figure 4.39 shows 
the spectra from the 0.5 year shielded geometries. Figure 4.40 shows the spectra from 10 
year shielded geometries. The lead shielding proves effective at significantly reducing the 
low energy peaks in both the spectrum with and without 232U. As a result, the fresh spectra 
are well below background and would be difficult to detect. However, the spectra with 232U 
at 0.5 and 10 years is clearly visible above the spectra without 232U and background. The 
shielding has a minimal effect on the spectra with 232U, particularly at higher energies, as 
can be seen by the intensity of the 2.6 MeV 208Tl peak. This illustrates the significant 
increase in detectability after the build-up of 232U daughter products is present even when 
lead shielding is utilized. 
1.E-04
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
1.E+00
1.E+01
1.E+02
1.E+03
1.E+04
1.E+05
1.E+06
1.E+07
1.E+08
1.E+09
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Co
un
ts
Energy [MeV]
with U-232
without U-232
background
105 
 
 
Figure 4.38: Fresh shielded geometry 
 
Figure 4.39: 0.5 years shielded geometry 
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Figure 4.40: 10 years shielded geometry 
 Although the above spectra show an improvement in detectability, misidentification 
of this material is possible. 228Th is found in both the 232U and 232Th decay chain. As a result, 
the proceeding daughter products of 228Th are found in both the 232U materials considered 
here and in nature. The detection of these daughter products from nature could lead to a 
possible misidentification. In order to evaluate the impact of misidentification, additional 
background measurements would be necessary. Due to the computational nature of this 
study and inability to access the materials discussed in this section, additional 
measurements are possibilities for future works. 
 The following discussion will focus on the total neutron counts from MCNP6 
simulations of the neutron detector shown in Figure 3.6 10 meters from the security model. 
The measurement time is 10 minutes. The 90% isotopic vectors with and without 232U are 
utilized. Considering the lead shielding in the shielded geometry will have a negligible 
effect on the neutron emissions, only the shielded geometry is used. The total neutron 
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counts from the security model with 232U is 33 counts. The total neutron counts from the 
security model without 232U is approximately 0 counts. In order to determine whether this 
difference in counts is detectable, the background counts must be approximated. 
 The background counts are approximated by calculating the reaction rate of the 
background neutrons in the 3He within the detector. Equation 4.1 shows the relationship 
between the reaction rate (R) and the number of atoms (N), the neutron flux in units of 
neutrons/cm2·s (ф), and the cross section in units of cm2 (σ) (6). 
Equation 4.1 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝜀𝜀 
 In this analysis, the reaction rate calculated will be the total neutron count rate from 
background. The number of atoms is the total number of 3He atoms within the detector: 
1.984·1024. The neutron flux is the background neutron flux: approximately 0.015 n/cm2·s 
(61). The neutron flux can vary by several percent (62). The value chosen here represents a 
median approximation of the possible variations in neutron flux based on location. In 
addition to the flux, the energy spectrum of the background neutrons can vary greatly 
based on location. The presence of objects such as large concrete structures or variations in 
altitude can significantly impact the spectrum of background neutrons. The detection 
efficiency of 3He changes with neutron energy. Figure 4.41 shows the cross sections of 
various 3He-neutron interactions as a function of neutron energy. 
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Figure 4.41: 3He cross sections [barns] vs. neutron energy [eV] (63) 
 In neutron detectors, (n,p) interactions of the 3He produce neutron counts. 
Therefore, the (n,p) cross section of 3He should be used in this analysis. Much of the 
neutron background energy spectrum falls below 1 MeV. 100 barns (10-22 cm2) is chosen as 
this represents the cross section near the highest end of the neutron energy spectrum thus 
representing a conservative estimate. Lower energy neutrons would correspond to higher 
cross sections and only increase the detection of the background neutrons. The realistic 
value would depend heavily on the location of the background measurement. The value 
chosen here is intended to be an approximation. Using Equation 4.1, the background count 
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rate of the detector is 3 counts per second. For a 10 minute measurement, the background 
counts is 1786 counts. 
 Table 4.14 shows the neutron counts after a 10 minute measurement of the 90% 
isotopic vectors with and without 232U including background. The values are within a one-
sigma uncertainty and thus are not statistically differentiable. Unfortunately, this indicates 
the introductions of 232U did not significantly increase the neutron detectability of the 
material. The cross section chosen here assumed high energy background neutrons. 
Additional attenuation via structures such as concrete buildings would lower the energy of 
the background neutrons and thus increase the detection of these neutrons. An increase in 
the detection efficiency of the background neutrons would only strengthen the conclusion 
made here that the spontaneous fission of 232U will not significantly increase the neutron 
detectability of uranium materials. 
Table 4.14: Neutron counts with and without 232U including background 
Isotopic Vector Counts 
With 232U 1,819 ± 135 
Without 232U 1,786 ± 134 
 
4.2.6. Effects on Safeguards 
 This section discusses gamma ray and neutron non-destructive assay safeguards 
techniques. These techniques are done on the initial, 3%, 5%, and 20% uranium isotopic 
vectors with 232U (Table 3.6) and without 232U (Table 3.7) at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 
years. The results from the set of isotopic vectors with 232U are compared to that without 
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232U in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques in the presence of 232U. Only 
the can model shown in Figure 3.3 is used in this analysis. 
 First, a non-destructive technique using the 235U and 238U gamma ray peaks to 
quantify 235U enrichment is analyzed. The set of simulations found here represent a 5 
minute gamma ray measurement of the can models by a 2”x2” HPGe detector in MCNP6. 
The figures include both the spectra with and without 232U as well as red dashed lines at 
the 185.7 keV 235U peak and the 1001 keV 234mPa peak (utilized for 238U). 
 Figure 4.42 shows the initial uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U 
after 0.5 year. Figure 4.43 shows the initial uranium isotopic vector spectra with and 
without 232U. 
 
Figure 4.42: Initial uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year 
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Figure 4.43: Initial uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years 
 Figure 4.44 shows the 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U 
after 0.5 year. Figure 4.45 shows the 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 
232U after 10 years. 
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Figure 4.44: 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year 
 
Figure 4.45: 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years 
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 Figure 4.46 shows the 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U 
after 0.5 year. Figure 4.47 shows the 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 
232U after 10 years. 
 
Figure 4.46: 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year 
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Figure 4.47: 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years 
 Figure 4.48 shows the 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U 
after 0.5 year. Figure 4.49 shows the 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and 
without 232U after 10 years. 
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Figure 4.48: 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year 
 
Figure 4.49: 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years 
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discussed here relies on the calculation of the net peak area of these peaks, this is the first 
indication that the technique may not be effective. Using Equation 3.19 and Equation 3.20, 
the net peak areas of the 235U and 238U peaks are calculated using the same regions in all of 
the spectra shown above. The ratio of the peaks is input into Equation 3.18 to calculate the 
ratio. 
 Table 4.15 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the initial uranium 
isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years. 
Table 4.15: Peak ratios from the initial uranium isotopic vectors 
   Counts ratio 
0.5 y 
without 232U 
235U 171,900 ± 508 
4.752 ± 17.850 
238U 112,700 ± 383 
With 232U 
235U 426,300 ± 1,592,520 
238U 1,328,000 ± 520,588 
10 y 
without 232U 
235U 171,900 ± 508 
4.406 ± 15.550 
238U 113,300 ± 384 
with 232U 
235U 2,437,000 ± 8.544.664 
238U 7,078,000 ± 2,834.231 
 
 Table 4.16 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the 3% uranium 
isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years. 
Table 4.16: Peak ratios from the 3% uranium isotopic vectors 
   Counts ratio 
0.5 y 
without 232U 
235U 717,200± 1,064 
32.94 ± 232.00 
238U 110,300 ± 404 
with 232U 
235U 1,304,000 ± 9,166,000 
238U 6,604,000 ± 3,030,000 
10 y 
without 232U 
235U 717,300 ± 1,064 
6.58 ± 8.47 
238U 110,800 ± 405 
with 232U 
235U 46,370,000 ± 56,780,000 
238U 47,170,000 ± 18,640,000 
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 Table 4.17 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the 5% uranium 
isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years. 
Table 4.17: Peak ratios from the 5% uranium isotopic vectors 
   Count rate ratio 
0.5 y 
without 232U 
235U 1,191,000 ± 1,407 
15.40 ± 27.30 
238U 108,000 ± 412 
with 232U 
235U 10,230,000 ± 17,660,000 
238U 14,270,000 ± 5,764,000 
10 y 
without 232U 
235U 1,191,000 ± 1,407 
13.34 ± 18.81 
238U 108,600 ± 413 
with 232U 
235U 72,830,000 ± 99,200,000 
238U 88,510,000 ± 32,380,000 
 
 Table 4.18 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the 20% uranium 
isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years. 
Table 4.18: Peak ratios from the 20% uranium isotopic vectors 
   Count rate ratio 
0.5 y 
without 232U 
235U 4,819,000 ± 3,214 
76.34 ± 137.67 
238U 90,600 ± 435 
with232U 
235U 41,670,000 ± 73,280,000 
238U 60,110,000 ± 23,940,000 
10 y 
without 232U 
235U 4,819,000 ± 3,214 
55.57 ± 73.65 
238U 91,070 ± 437 
with 232U 
235U 316,500,000 ± 399,700,000 
238U 332,300,000 ± 133,700,000 
 
 As initially indicated by the spectra, the technique proves to be ineffective. The 
ratios in each case disagree from unity and have large uncertainties. This is due to the 
inability to precisely calculate the net peak area of the 235U and 238U peaks in the presence 
of 232U and its daughter products. The high gamma source strengths of the daughter 
products of 232U produce a continuum which hides the 235U and 238U peaks making them 
statistically undetectable. The final ratio found is useless for quantifying 235U enrichment. 
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This illustrates that this safeguards technique is not useful in the presence of 232U 
concentrations discussed here. 
 The following analysis evaluates a passive neutron multiplicity technique to 
calculate uranium mass. The singles, doubles, and triples counts from a passive AWCC 10 
minutes measurement of the can models with and without 232U are utilized to calculate the 
effective 232U and 238U masses. Table 4.19 shows the passives singles, doubles, and triples 
counts from the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. Table 4.20 shows the singles, doubles, 
and triples counts from the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U. The uncertainties shown 
are the expected experimental uncertainties calculated using a method developed by Dr. 
Croft (57). 
Table 4.19: Passive singles, doubles, and triples counts from uranium isotopic vectors with 
232U 
 Initial 3% 5% 20% 
Singles 399,476 ± 637 2,446,709 ± 1,576 4,230,597 ± 2,074 17,825,942 ± 4,272 
Doubles 2,070 ± 268 12,581 ± 1,624 23,101 ± 2,807 141,074 ± 11,891 
Triples 141 ± 61 857 ± 844 1,614 ± 1,909 10,870 ± 16,527 
 
Table 4.20: Passive singles, doubles, and triples counts from uranium isotopic vectors without 
232U 
 Initial 3% 5% 20% 
Singles 1,365 ± 45 1,404 ± 45 1,396 ± 45 1,643 ± 47 
Doubles 214 ± 20 210 ± 19 209 ± 19 182 ± 17 
Triples 17 ± 6 17 ± 6 17 ± 6 16 ± 5 
 
 The following tables show multiple variables needed to calculate the effective 232U 
and 238U masses. These variables are the spontaneous fission factorial moments (νs1, νs2, 
νs3), doubles gate fraction (fd), triples gate fraction (ft), efficiency (ε), and neutron die-away 
(τ) time calculated. Each variable was obtained via the same MCNP6 passive simulations 
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that yielded the singles, doubles, and triples counts above. Table 4.21 shows these values 
for the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. Table 4.22 shows these values for the uranium 
isotopic vectors without 232U. 
Table 4.21: Multiplicity analysis variables for uranium isotopic vectors with 232U 
 Initial 3% 5% 20% 
νs1 1.98 1.94 1.92 1.81 
νs2 5.72 5.60 5.50 5.16 
νs3 16.92 16.68 16.56 16.90 
fd 0.663 0.663 0.664 0.657 
ft 0.440 0.439 0.441 0.432 
ε 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.300 
τ [µs] 49.44 49.49 49.27 50.44 
 
Table 4.22: Multiplicity analysis variables for uranium isotopic vectors without 232U 
 Initial 3% 5% 20% 
νs1 2.72 2.69 2.68 2.62 
νs2 6.33 6.16 6.05 5.69 
νs3 12.07 11.49 11.12 9.84 
fd 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.662 
ft 0.434 0.434 0.434 0.438 
ε 0.325 0.325 0.327 0.325 
τ [µs] 50.20 50.21 50.17 49.68 
 
 In order to illustrate the technique is effective in uranium materials without 232U, 
the effective 238U masses (m238 eff) for the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U are 
calculated using Equation 3.25 with the singles, doubles, and triples counts in Table 4.20 
and the values in Table 4.22. The known values are calculated using Equation 3.22. As 
shown in Table 4.23, the calculated effective 238U mass agrees well with the known values.  
This shows the technique works well when not in the presence of 232U 
120 
 
Table 4.23: Calculated and known effective 238U masses from the uranium isotopic vectors 
without 232U 
 m238 eff [g] 
 
Calculated Known Percent difference 
Initial 983 983 0.00 
3% 961 961 0.00 
5% 945 941 0.43 
20% 796 790 0.76 
 
 Table 4.24 shows the calculated and known effective 238U masses (m238 eff) and 232U 
masses (m232 eff) from the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. The effective 232U masses 
were calculated using Equation 3.26 and the effective 238U masses were calculated using 
Equation 3.25 with the singles, doubles, and triples counts in Table 4.19 and the values in 
Table 4.21. The known effective 232U masses were found using Equation 3.24 and the 
known effective 238U masses were found using Equation 3.22. The calculated and known 
values disagree considerably. 
Table 4.24: Calculated and known effective 238U and 232U masses from the uranium isotopic 
vectors with 232U 
 m232 eff [g] m238 eff [g] 
 
Calculated Known Percent difference Calculated Known 
Percent 
difference 
Initial 26 13 100 11,131 1,005 1,007 
3% 195 14 1,293 67,864 1,095 6,097 
5% 239 15 1,493 122,491 1,172 10,351 
20% 337 23 1,365 689,192 1,761 39,036 
 
 In order to attempt to correct the disagreement between the calculate and known 
values, rather than use the leakage multiplication found via Equation 3.28, the net 
multiplication (Mnet) from the MCNP6 simulations is used instead. This net multiplication is 
a weighted average of the net multiplications found via the (α,n) and spontaneous fission 
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MCNP6 simulations. Table 4.25 shows the calculated and known effective 238U masses (m238 
eff) and 232U masses (m232 eff). Although this percent difference is less using Mnet, the 
disagreement is still too significant to accurately and effectively quantify the uranium mass. 
Table 4.25: Calculated and known effective 238U and 232U masses from the uranium isotopic 
vectors with 232U using Mnet 
 m232 eff [g] m238 eff [g] 
 
Calculated Known Percent difference Calculated Known 
Percent 
difference 
Initial 16 13 23.08 1,685 1,005 67.66 
3% 45 14 221.43 4,798 1,095 338.17 
5% 76 15 406.67 7,977 1,172 580.63 
20% 567 23 2,365.22 55,525 1,761 3,053.04 
 
 The major difference between the neutron emissions of the uranium isotopic 
vectors with 232U and without 232U is the significant difference in their (α,n) emission rates. 
Table 4.26 shows the (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron emission rates of the uranium 
isotopic vectors with 232U. Table 4.27 shows the (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron 
emission rates of the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U. As shown in the tables below, 
the α decay of 232U in the UO2 produces significantly more (α,n) neutrons than those found 
in the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U. 
Table 4.26: (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron emission rates of uranium isotopic vectors 
with 232U [n/s] 
 
(α,n) Spontaneous Fission Total 
Initial 4,365 14 4,379 
3% 26,785 16 26,801 
5% 46,274 17 46,291 
20% 193,633 28 193,661 
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Table 4.27: (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron emission rates of uranium isotopic vectors 
without 232U [n/s] 
 
(α,n) Spontaneous Fission Total 
Initial 0 14 14 
3% 1 13 14 
5% 1 13 14 
20% 6 11 17 
 
 The significantly larger (α,n) source strength in the uranium isotopic vectors with 
232U cause a notable increase in the sensitivity of the relationship between the effective 
masses and the leakage multiplication. Figure 4.50 shows the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) 
as a function of the leakage multiplication (ML). Slight variations in the leakage 
multiplication will produce only slight variations in the effective 238U mass. For example, a 
1% difference in the leakage multiplication will produce only a difference of approximately 
10 grams in the effective 238U masses. 
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Figure 4.50: Effective 238U mass vs. leakage multiplication from uranium isotopic vectors 
without 232U 
 Figure 4.51 shows the effective 232U mass (m232 eff) as a function of the leakage 
multiplication (ML) from the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. Unlike the relationship 
shown in Figure 4.50, the relationship between the effective 232U mass and the leakage 
multiplication is significantly sensitive. Slight variations in the leakage multiplication 
produces significantly different 232U mass values (on the order of 100s to 1000s of grams). 
This impact increases with higher concentrations of 232U. Minor errors in the nuclear data 
used will produce significantly erroneous effective 232U masses. The limited nuclear data of 
232U produces significant issues with the use of this technique to quantify uranium mass. In 
order to effectively calculate the uranium mass via passive neutron interrogation in the 
presence of 232U, further investigation must be done to produce accurate nuclear data for 
232U in real world measurements. 
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Figure 4.51: Effective 232U mass vs. leakage multiplication from uranium isotopic vectors with 
232U 
 In addition to the passive neutron interrogation discussed here, an active analysis is 
also done. The AWCC is utilized in its active configuration in MCNP6 to produce active 
doubles count rates from the uranium isotopic vectors with and without 232U. Figure 4.52 
shows the active doubles count rates graphed as a function of the 235U mass from the 
uranium isotopic vectors with and without 232U. The relationship between the active 
doubles count rate and the 235U mass are similar both with and without 232U. There is a 
slight contribution in the active doubles count rate from the 232U mass. If the passive 
doubles count rate can be removed from the active measurement, then this active 
interrogation could possibly be used to quantify the 235U mass. 
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Figure 4.52: Active doubles count rate vs. 235U mass 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
5.1. Plutonium Conclusions 
 The analyses in this study illustrate the value of increasing the concentration of 
238Pu in used fuel for reducing the material attractiveness. However, the magnitude of this 
decrease in material attractiveness is not significant enough to warrant the label of 
“proliferation proof” or even unattractive for weapons purposes. Although the model based 
analysis was promising, the Figure of Merit analysis showed the difficulty in reaching the 
unattractive limit via increased 238Pu concentrations. 
 The model based approach concluded the concentration of 238Pu in the plutonium 
isotopic vector shown in Table 3.1 was high enough to render the HNED models described 
in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 useless. In the time dependent analysis of the more realistic 
model (Table 3.4), the self-explosion temperature in the high explosives was reached after 
approximately 7.5 hours from the initial insertion of the weapons pit into the model. 
However, external cooling with liquid nitrogen prevented the self-explosion temperature 
from being reached. The tensile strength in the high explosives and beryllium was reached 
in all four scenarios, likely producing plastic deformation. The possibility of the weapon 
being rendered totally useless or a significant reduction in the yield represent major 
obstacles to proliferation. These results show the impractically and difficulty in 
weaponizing this plutonium vector for these simple implosion models. 
 The application of the Figure of Merit equations shown in Equation 2.1 and Equation 
2 to the plutonium vector yielded significantly fewer positive results regarding its material 
attractiveness. In comparison to the additional plutonium vectors from Table 3.5, the 
material attractiveness was lower. However, all three fell within the same range for both 
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FOM equations. For less technically advanced states, all three plutonium vectors are 
unattractive according to FOM1 (Equation 2.1). For technically advanced states, all three 
plutonium vectors are attractive according to FOM2 (Equation 2.2). This conclusion is to be 
expected as the heat generation factor in FOM equations is normalized to 80% 238Pu and 
the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate is normalized to reactor grade. Thus, any 
plutonium isotopic vector from used reactor fuel with less than 80% 238Pu will be 
unattractive for less technically advanced states and attractive for technically advanced 
states. Currently, surpassing these limits in used fuel is in most cases impractical or even 
unattainable given current reactor designs. Therefor as long as the Figure of Merit 
approach discussed here in its present form is used to analyze plutonium vectors from 
used fuel, these conclusions will be the same. 
5.2. Uranium Conclusions 
 This study successfully illustrated the reduction of material attractiveness in 
uranium materials via the introduction of 232U and the build-up of its daughter products. 
Unlike the case of the plutonium analysis, this reduction of material attractiveness proved 
successful in both the model based and Figure of Merit analyses. However, the introduction 
of 232U poses additional obstacles to its implementation in a civilian nuclear fuel cycle. 
 The model based analysis showed the concentration of 232U in the weapons grade 
uranium vector (90%) from Table 3.6 in the model shown in Table 3.8 sufficient to reduce 
the material attractiveness. As shown in Figure 4.14 through Figure 4.20, the temperature 
in the high explosives exceeds its self-explosion temperature rendering the weapon 
useless. In addition, the high explosives begin to degrade after 2.1 years as a result of 
radiation dose. The transient heat transfer analysis showed that the self-explosion 
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temperature within the high explosives is reached after approximately 1 day, unless the 
model is continuously externally cooled by liquid nitrogen. Similarly, to the plutonium 
model based results, the strength of the high explosives and beryllium is surpassed in all 
four scenarios. This will likely produce plastic deformation in those materials and a 
possible reduction in the yield. The model based analysis illustrates the impracticality of 
utilizing this uranium material in simple implosion type fission weapons. 
 The Figure of Merit results also show a significant decrease in material 
attractiveness. Considering the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of the 
weapons grade uranium vector is relatively low, the FOM equations for less technically 
advanced states (Equation 2.1) and for technically advanced states (Equation 2.2) yield the 
same results. Thus, these conclusions are valid for both less technically advanced and 
technically advanced states. As shown in Figure 4.34, the build-up of 232U’s daughter 
products causes the material to become unattractive for weapons purposes within the first 
6 to 9 months after separation. In order to maintain the weapons usability of the material, 
the daughter products must be removed approximately semi-annually. This poses a 
significant burden on the proliferating state and would be impractical. 
 Although the merits of utilizing 232U to decrease material attractiveness are clear, 
implementing 232U in civilian nuclear fuel cycles would be difficult. At the 232U 
concentrations shown in Table 3.6, the dose rate from the pellet (Figure 3.1), rod (Figure 
3.2), and can (Figure 3.3) pose a significant safety risk. The 5 rem annual limit imposed by 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be reached far too quickly and thus 
significant shielding would be required. In addition, both gamma ray and neutron non-
destructive assay techniques proved ineffective in the presence of 232U. Although, 
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quantifying 235U mass via active neutron interrogation may be possible. Considering both 
the safety and safeguards concerns, the decrease in material attractiveness is currently not 
sufficient to justify the implementation of 232U at these concentrations in a civilian nuclear 
fuel cycle. The burden of increasing shielding throughout the handling of the material as 
well as the need for new non-destructive assay safeguards techniques would likely 
outweigh the obstacles to proliferation from most state’s perspectives. 
 One of the most beneficial conclusions of this study is the increase in detectability 
with the addition of 232U. Although the security neutron analysis showed no increase in 
detectability, the security gamma ray analysis showed a significant increase in 
detectability. When comparing gamma ray measurements of the 90% vector with 232U 
(Table 3.6) and that without 232U (Table 3.7), the spectra with 232U are clearly 
distinguishable between background and the spectra without 232U, in particularly at the 6 
month and 10 year time intervals. The intensity of the spectra with 232U indicates the 
possibility of producing an increase in detectability even at a lower concentration of 232U. 
Although the concentrations of 232U discussed here are likely too high to implement within 
a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, the possibility of implementing lower concentrations of 232U 
exists. This possibility could come to fruition if the safety and safeguards impacts of 232U 
are minimized while its impact on gamma ray detectability is further evaluated. Combing 
computational and experimental efforts to explore gamma ray measurements of uranium 
materials with significantly lower concentrations of 232U than those discussed here would 
be useful to determine the minimum amount of 232U that would produce a notable increase 
in detectability. 
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5.3. Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Material Attractiveness Analyses 
 This study utilized two different techniques to evaluate material attractiveness that 
represent both a specific evaluation and a more broad evaluation. The model based 
analysis is likely the most restrictive analysis in terms of overall material attractiveness 
conclusions. Although it is impossible to evaluate the material attractiveness for specific 
HNED models, a comprehensive determination must involve all the possible permutations 
of nuclear weapons designs. Currently this is not possible, because the vast majority of 
these possible designs fall within the classified space. The Figure of Merit analysis 
discussed in this study allows for a more comprehensives evaluation while still relying on 
open source information for the analysis. However, these techniques are just two of the 
many possible techniques utilized to quantify material attractiveness or proliferation 
resistance. 
 As mentioned in this study, the most significant shortcoming of the FOM equations 
shown in Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2 is its inability to account for processes such as 
enrichment or reprocessing. In the uranium analysis, this study evaluated several isotopic 
vectors at various 235U concentrations originating from the same initial uranium isotopic 
vector. Due to limits of the FOM equations, the material attractiveness of only the weapons 
grade (90%) isotopic vector could be considered. Therefor the entire enrichment process is 
neglected in the final determination of this material attractiveness. Ideally, the material 
attractiveness of the specific material initially possessed by the state would be useful 
rather than the material attractiveness of the weaponized version of this material. 
Similarly, the plutonium analysis only considers the plutonium isotopic vector in its final 
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metallic state rather than present in the used fuel. This doesn’t account for the processing 
required to remove plutonium from the used fuel.  
 A public workshop preformed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy 
known as the “Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles” discussed several aspects of 
proliferation risk assessments (64). This workshop not only discussed the Figure of Merit 
analysis used here, but also more comprehensive methods of evaluating proliferation 
resistance. These more comprehensive methods not only consider the material 
attractiveness, but also many factors that contribute to proliferation risk such as 
characteristics of the entire fuel cycle or the proliferant state. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive of these methods is the Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation 
Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR) that was developed at Texas A&M (65). PRAETOR uses 
what is known as a multi attribute utility analysis methodology to consider many possible 
attributes to the proliferation of nuclear material to quantify the associated proliferation 
risk (66). Although useful, this method is most useful in analyzing a larger aspect of a 
nuclear fuel cycle rather than a specific material. 
Another specific illustration of the shortcomings of the Figure of Merit analysis can 
also be found in the literature. A group at LLNL applied the figure of merit equation to a 
specific material but made additional considerations (66). Although the figure of merit 
conclusions showed the material was attractive, the group recognized the following 
attributes were not evaluated in the FOM analysis: the difficulty of stealing, diverting, or 
transporting the material and the number of significant quantities available. The group 
concluded that combining the figure of merit with these additional considerations proves 
useful although they concede that it may be “impossible to come up with absolute 
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quantitative measures of proliferation resistance.” This final conclusion serves as the main 
justification for only utilizing the FOM equations to quantify the material attractiveness. 
If the techniques described in this study (utilizing 238Pu and 232U for decreasing 
material attractiveness) were to be expanded, the use of a tool such as PRAETOR would be 
useful. In the case of the plutonium material, the final conclusions would not likely change, 
because the current obstacles of reprocessing and handling of similar plutonium materials 
are not considered significant to justify a reduction in safeguards. However, in the case of 
uranium, the final conclusions may possibly differ. The decay of 232U poses significant 
handling and reprocessing issues. If the safety and safeguards issues shown here were 
overcame and 232U were implemented into a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, applying a 
PRAETOR would be necessary as a compliment to the FOM analysis. Analysis this 
hypothetical fuel cycle that included 232U might shed additional light on 232U’s 
comprehensive effect at reducing the proliferation risk. However, this is outside of the 
scope of this study and would require additional considerations to limit the burden of 232U 
on the state seeking to use the material for peaceful purposes. 
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